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ARTICLE
PROPERTIES OF MARRIAGE
Carolynj Frantz* & Hanoch Dagan**
In this Article, Professors Frantz and Dagan articulate and examine
one ideal for the institution of marriage-marriage as an egalitarian liberal
community. Under this vision, a commitment to marital community, where
spouses share with each other without reference to individual desert, is com-
bined with a concern for non-subordination and the protection of individual
autonomy through, primarily, free exit. Professors Frantz and Dagan argue
that, contrary to the common assumption that these goals are incompatible,
they can be accommodated to a remarkable degree. They then trace the impli-
cations of this vision of marriage for marital property law, and use it to
defend the equal division rule for existing marital property, broadly defined
to include, most notably, increases (and decreases) in both spouses' earning
capacity during the pendency of their marriage. Professors Frantz and Da-
gan also discuss alimony, endorsing generally the practice of rehabilitative
alimony, and property governance during marriage, arguing in favor of
management rules currently applied in many community property states.
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INTRODUCTION
It is tempting to think of the legal rules surrounding marital prop-
erty in the temporal context of divorce. Because these rules practically
apply most often at the moment of divorce, commentators tend to focus
more on their impact on divorced and divorcing couples than on ongo-
ing marital relationships.' But these rules are centrally about marriage,
even marriages so successful they ultimately do not have to use them.
Through marital property law, the state has the opportunity to help
shape the social understanding of marriage, and thus the actions of those
who partake in it. The law governing the division of property upon di-
vorce operates on ongoing marriages because possibilities upon divorce
give spouses reasons to act in ways better or worse for their individual
marriages. More obviously, governance rules operate during marriage,
both as a rare source of litigation and to shape spouses' expectations and
behavior with respect to marital property. This Article looks at marital
property law through the lens of the ongoing marriage.
1. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law
and Social Change, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 21, 24 (1974) (noting that marital property law is of
little interest to spouses during marriage, but becomes important "when family life is
disrupted by divorce"); Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce
Reform, in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads 6, 30-31 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma
Hill Kay eds., 1990) (noting that couples will likely not take into account the possibility of
divorce when making marital choices); Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital
Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 197, 205-09 (explaining why spouses do
not consider the impact on alimony when making marital decisions); Elizabeth S. Scott &
Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225, 1298-99 (1998)
(explaining that social and relational norms largely govern working marriages, while legal
rules and enforcement become important upon divorce); cf. Jeremy Waldron, When
Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, in Liberal Rights 370, 374 (1993)
(limiting the role of legal rules during marriage to providing spouses with knowledge of
their fallback position upon divorce).
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We provide rare currency in the discussion of marital property law by
articulating a particular ideal of marriage and examining its doctrinal im-
plications. In setting this ideal, we bring together three values, promi-
nent in academic and popular debate on marital property law, that are
usually put forth as rivals: community, autonomy, and equality. We do
not deny the potential tensions between these values in the abstract. And
yet-except in the limited context of rehabilitative alimony-we hope to
break away from the traditional discourse that requires balancing these
values or exalting one at the exclusion of the others. This Article main-
tains that certain conceptions of community, autonomy, and equality can
actually complement each other under one vision of marriage: marriage
as an egalitarian liberal community. The saliency of community, auton-
omy, and equality in academic and popular discussions of marriage gives
us hope that our identification of a coherent ideal of marriage in which
all three marital virtues can be accommodated will appeal to readers' in-
tuitions about the value of the institution.
Part I presents and defends the ideal of marriage as an egalitarian
liberal community. This ideal uniquely brings together three threads of
marriage typically thought to be incompatible-community, autonomy,
and equality. The appeal of a communal marriage and the benefits (both
consequential and intrinsic) it provides are particularly strong.2 But mar-
ital community has not been without cost. Modem liberal societies are
justifiably not so willing to accept the restrictions on autonomy that mem-
bership in a marital community has traditionally entailed. The move to
"no-fault" divorce-the expansion of spouses' right to exit-is emblem-
atic of attempts to protect autonomy within marriage. Even more signifi-
cantly, because marriage has also been a tool of oppression, marital prop-
erty law must strive to achieve equality between spouses. The shadow of
the patriarchal family still hovers over modern marriage. A commitment
to gender equality is thus a constraint on any acceptable contemporary
marriage law. For these reasons, marital community must be constrained
on the one hand by autonomy and on the other by equality.
Marriage as an egalitarian liberal community attempts to bring to-
gether these goals. Focusing on the frictions between community, auton-
omy, and equality in the marital context, scholars tend to emphasize one
element of the ideal to the exclusion of the others. For instance, while
2. We do not suggest that marriage is the only relationship that can provide
meaningful self-identification and the associated goods of intimacy. For whatever reason,
marriage is presently the overwhelmingly dominant social institution of pervasive sharing
among adults. But it is not the only one. For instance, the law of cohabitation supports
many nonmarital long-term romantic relationships that function in a similar, but not
identical, way. Furthermore, the doctrine of undue influence can be understood as
supporting other non-romantic relationships of informal intimacy (for instance,
relationships between adult brothers and sisters, or close friends). For an examination of
the application of one set of legal rules in these contexts, see Hanoch Dagan, The Law and
Ethics of Restitution (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 176-224, on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (discussing the law of restitution in the context of informal intimacy).
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the communitarian aspect of marriage is celebrated by more traditional
family law scholars, 3 these scholars tend to exalt community at the ex-
pense of the other virtues of marriage-equality and autonomy. Feminist
scholars and those who see marriage as just another species of contract,
by contrast, tend to focus on equality and autonomy (respectively) almost
exclusively, ignoring the communal dimension of marriage when making
their prescriptions for marital property division. 4 We challenge both
camps, claiming not only that equality and autonomy constraints do not
typically threaten the virtues of communal marriage, but also that they
often support community at its best.
Part II fleshes out the implications of these normative commitments
for marital property law. Marital property law can be thought of as a
particular species of a "liberal commons,"5 a legal regime that facilitates
the ability of a limited group of owners to capture the economic and
social benefits from cooperative use of a scarce resource, while also ensur-
ing autonomy for individual members, particularly through their reten-
tion of a secure right of exit.6 But the marital liberal commons regime we
articulate in Part II has unique features that are not part of the liberal
commons as a general form of property governance. In particular, the
kind of community contemplated by marriage resists individual account-
3. Lynn Wardle and Carl Schneider are the leading traditional family law scholars.
Wardle has criticized no-fault divorce on the grounds that it focuses inappropriately on
equality and individual autonomy in marriage, which, he contends, is governed by the
"higher law" of love, understood as sharing and self-sacrifice. Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault
Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 79, 121-24. Though Schneider is
less clear in his writings on his own view of marital regulation, his discussion of the shift
from community-based moral discourse to (individual and equality-based) discourse
centered on personal fulfillment and liberty reads most naturally as a lament. See, e.g.,
Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse,
1994 Utah L. Rev. 503. But see id. at 584-85 (addressing the possible need to balance
between values in the marriage context).
4. See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers, and the Law
225-54 (1981) (emphasizing promotion of egalitarian relationships in advocating for
replacement of marriage with intimate contracts); Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade:
Bridging the Private/Public Distinction, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79, 79-85 (2001)
(focusing on reducing inequality in traditional family law models by transforming them
into business structures); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A
New Model for State Policy, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 207, 250-53 (1982) (pointing to the centrality
of individualism as support for state deference to private contracting in the marital
context).
5. See generally Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 Yale
LJ. 549 (2001).
6. See id. at 566-602 (discussing attributes of the liberal commons). Much modern
family law scholarship has identified the problem of the liberal commons as central to the
law of marriage, though sometimes using different terms. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Alone
Together: Law and the Meanings of Marriage 15-30 (1999) (discussing the role of both
autonomy and community, referring to the "external" and "internal" stances toward
marriage); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law, 1994 Utah
L. Rev. 687, 719-39 (proposing a liberal framework for family law that accommodates
community concerns).
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ing, one aspect of other liberal commons regimes. 7 Additionally, because
of its pervasiveness in the lives of its members, the marital community
must be concerned with equality (non-subordination) in a way that other
forms of collective ownership need not.
The core feature of the marital property regime we espouse in Part II
is that spouses are equal owners of the marital estate, broadly defined.
We maintain that this characterization supplies the best normative foun-
dation for the prevailing norm of equal property division upon divorce.
We further claim that a commitment to the ideal of marriage as an egali-
tarian liberal community also supports-albeit more contingently-the
current practice of rehabilitative alimony. Alongside these reaffirmations
of marital property law, our theory yields suggestions for reform-rules
that marital property law needs to adopt if it is to take seriously the com-
mitment to the ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community.
Both with regard to the scope of the marital estate and with respect to its
governance during an intact marriage, we subscribe to many of what are
now still minority views. For instance, we endorse a broad definition of
the marital estate that encompasses any changes effected during the ten-
ure of marriage in the earning capacity of the spouses. We also advocate
recognizing the interests of both spouses in the marital estate as present
and vested during marriage, rather than as mere expectancies that are
meaningful only upon divorce. Accordingly, we discuss property govern-
ance rules entailed by the commitment to the ideal of marriage as an
egalitarian liberal community.
This Article intentionally brackets three concerns. First, we follow
the traditional method of regulating marriage: setting legal rules that
support a potentially controversial marital ideal, while at the same time
allowing spouses considerable space to opt out." We do not defend this
aspect of our theory, leaving the question of the legitimacy of crafting
marital property law to reflect any ideal of marriage for another time.9
For now, it is sufficient to note that some notion of the good marriage is
likely to play a role even in the most hands-off of legal regimes; even
those advocating a greater role for private contracting in marriage1 ° need
to account for the types of marriage their rules tend to foster." I This is
7. Cf. Dagan & Heller, supra note 5, at 586-87 (arguing for accounting of certain
unilateral investments in a liberal commons to prevent underinvestment).
8. We also do not take a position here about how rigorously such agreements should
be enforced. Cf. American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations § 7.03, at 959 (2000) (presenting a rigorous enforcement
regime for marital agreements and noting exceptions) [hereinafter ALI Principles].
9. One of us is in the process of exploring this question. See Carolyn J. Frantz,
Should Marital Property Default Rules Be Transformative?, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F.
(forthcoming).
10. See, e.g., Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:
Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 Ind. L.J. 453, 464-65 (1998).
11. See Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory 151 (1989)
(arguing that even the most liberal states must promote some conceptions of the good
2004]
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truer with marriage than with other legal institutions, as relatively few
spouses choose to privately order their relationships. 12
Second, we bracket values external to the interspousal relationship.
Marriage may affect other social institutions or be a useful tool for accom-
plishing various social goals. For instance, marital property rules play a
role in welfare distribution. They also affect the economy through wage
incentives. We do not discuss such external considerations in this Article,
but we acknowledge that, after full consideration, such concerns may ulti-
mately require compromise with regard to certain rules we
recommend.13
The bracketing of one external value-the care and support of chil-
dren-may seem particularly controversial. Raising children is certainly
one of the most important reasons for marriage (some say the most im-
portant one), and the need to care for children will undoubtedly alter
the rules of divorce in many marriages.' 4 Nonetheless, it is possible-
indeed desirable-to separate discussion of the relationship between
spouses qua spouses from their relationship qua co-parents. We do not
deny that the full picture of spouses' rights and obligations in the large
number of divorces involving minor children is affected by the rights and
obligations entailed by both relationships. But it is still necessary to ana-
lyze each relationship on its own terms. Marriage rules alone tell the
whole story for the considerable number of those who do not have chil-
dren and for those whose children are beyond the age of parental respon-
sibility. Moreover, even with respect to spouses who are also co-parents, a
satisfying picture of the whole must begin with separate analyses of each
dimension. The reasons for one's obligation to one's child-the norma-
while undercutting others); Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function of Family Law, 20
Hofstra L. Rev. 495, 498-502 (1992) (describing the channeling function of law generally
and of family law specifically).
12. Even with the dramatic increase in premarital and marital contracting over the
past few decades, only (approximately) five percent of marrying couples sign prenuptial
agreements. See Gary Belsky, Living by the Rules, Money, May 1996, at 100, 102.
Understandably, the percentage is significantly higher in cases of remarriage. See Ellen
Stark, A Quickie Guide to Prenups for Trump, Gates-and You, Money, June 1993, at 17
(estimating prenuptial agreements in twenty percent of remarriages).
13. Cf. Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation:
Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1265,
1308-09 (2001) (stating that the public function of family law, as well as its private
dimensions, should be considered). Just as we recognize that our account may require
compromise with external values, an external account of marital property law must take
into consideration its impact on the internal aspect of marriage.
14. See, e.g., June Carbone, From Partners to Parents: The Second Revolution in
Family Law, at xiii (2000) ("Across the academy, the courts, classrooms, and election
campaigns, the code of family responsibility is being rewritten in terms of the only ties
left-the ones to children.").
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tive underpinnings of rules regarding child support-are very different
from those underlying one's obligations to his or her spouse. 15
I. MARRIAGE AS AN EGALITARIAN LIBERAL COMMUNITY
Marriage as an egalitarian liberal community brings together three
strands of marriage-community, autonomy, and equality. Though it is
often assumed that they cannot coexist, this account of marriage accom-
modates particular conceptions of these three ideals to a remarkable de-
gree. The point is neither that these concepts, in the abstract, are always
compatible, nor that we offer an account of how to balance their inevita-
bly competing requirements. The content of each of these concepts is
deeply contested, 16 and an abstract attempt to balance their demands is
unlikely to be determinate enough to yield a workable set of rules for
marital property. Therefore, rather than appealing vaguely to commu-
nity, equality, and autonomy, we set forth particular conceptions of these
ideals and show that, in the marital context, these conceptions actually
reinforce rather than undermine one another. By demonstrating that
our account of marriage harmonizes conceptions of these values-and,
indeed, shows how these values can be mutually supportive-this Part
seeks to vindicate the viability and desirability of the ideal of marriage as
an egalitarian liberal community.1 7
A. Marital Virtues
1. Community
a. Plural Identity and Sharing. - There are many benefits to being
married. Like any other pooling of resources, marriage provides advan-
tages of economies of scale, specialization, and risk spreading.1 8 But
these goods are hardly unique to marriage, and, more importantly, can
be purchased on the market. The unique goods of "communal" mar-
riage 1g-intimacy, caring, and commitment-are collective in a crucially
15. For instance, it is unlikely that the relationship between parents and children will
have the liberal dimension-in particular, the need for free exit-that underlies the
relationship between spouses.
16. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 Proc. Aristotelian Soc'y 167,
169 (1956) (describing essentially contested concepts as "concepts the proper use of which
inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users").
17. Even if the reader interprets this Article as balancing these values, this does not
undermine our project. If it is impossible to accommodate all three values simultaneously,
and balancing is inevitable, our account can be read as providing a framework for this
exercise.
18. See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or "I Gave Him the Best
Years of My Life," 16J. Legal Stud. 267, 269-70 (1987); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage
Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 65, 100-08 (1998); Robert C.
Ellickson, The Law and Economics of the Household § I.C.1 (Mar. 8, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
19. We do not deny that these goods can be obtained through other romantic
relationships, and to a lesser extent, through non-romantic ones. See supra note 2.
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different way.20 A mercenary understanding of these goods is hopelessly
misguided, corrupting the community ideal of marriage. A self-centered
quest to capture these marital goods-cooperating to achieve solely indi-
vidual ends-will not ultimately be successful. Rather, to secure these
unique goods of marriage, what is good for one spouse must affect what is
good for the other. This partial fusion, at the core of communal mar-
riage, is achieved when spouses perceive themselves at least partially as a
"we," a plural subject, that is in turn a constitutive feature of each
spouse's identity as an "I."21
It is not surprising that marriage is often a site for such communal
life. Membership in a functioning marital community may be the best
way to achieve one's communal goals. Spouses typically engage in a vari-
ety of collective projects, including child rearing, broader family relation-
ships, friendships, and the common management of resources-a house-
hold, investments, and careers. This ever-increasing number of projects
requires daily interactions that in turn produce an intensive, long-term
fusion. It is this intensity (and its continuity) that stimulates closeness,
interdependency, and mutual trust.22
The association of marriage with the creation of plural identity is
consistent with the move of divorce law from the title theory of property
ownership-where each spouse individually owns property he or she has
purchased with separate funds-to a regime that acknowledges the enti-
tlements of both spouses in many marital goods. Sharing the advantages
of life together as well as its difficulties is the linchpin of community.23
Sharing requires spouses to "infuse [ I] costs and benefits with an intersub-
jective character" and to reject any "strict accounting based on individual
20. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev.
225, 228-29 (1997); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J.
624, 632, 635 (1980) (noting that "the core associational value of intimacy is not to be
reduced to its instrumental uses" and that caring is normally complemented by being
cared for and requires a true commitment to the other).
21. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 151 (1993); Margaret
Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation 2, 8 (1996); see also Milton
C. Regan, Jr., Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy 147 (1993) (discussing the relational
identity of individuals cultivated in marriage); Karst, supra note 20, at 635-37 (describing
the impact of intimate relationships on self-definition: "When they are chosen, they take
on expressive dimensions as statements defining ourselves."); Martha Minow & Mary
Lindon Shanley, Relational Rights and Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in Liberal
Political Theory and Law, 11 Hypatia 4, 5 (1996) (noting that family members are partially
defined by their relationships with others).
22. See Gilbert, supra note 21, at 222-23.
23. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 21, at 138, 147 (arguing that marriage involves
sharing "the burdens of living in what sometimes seems a capricious and indifferent
universe"); Simon Gardner, Rethinking Family Property, 109 L.Q. Rev. 263, 290-91 (1993)
("The connotations of marriage are well known. They include a commitment to organise
the parties' whole lives according to the values of trust and collaboration.... [S]o far as
marriage is concerned, communality seems incontestably the right approach.").
[Vol. 104:75
PROPERTIES OF MARRIAGE
merit."2 4 Realization of collective goods in marriage depends on each
partner "carrying out the projects constitutive of his shared life in a spirit
of trust and love rather than of the piecemeal calculation of individual
advantage. '25 Communal marriage demands that spouses not ask for ac-
countings or make individual claims of entitlement to marital goods. 26
Rather, their cooperation should be based on an expectation of a lasting
relationship that calls for mutual trust, support, and confident reliance
on the other;27 sharing life and its projects requires spouses to pool their
efforts and their rewards, "each operating on joint behalf of both. '28
24. Regan, supra note 21, at 147; see also Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in
Marriage, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1971, 1981 (2000) (discussing the results of a study indicating that
"[k]eeping the mental books ... is dangerous for a marriage"); Wardle, supra note 3, at
123 (noting the incompatibility of individual accounting and marital satisfaction); cf.
Ellickson, supra note 18, § III.A ("In a successful household, explicit reference to
perceived imbalances in internal gift exchange may be regarded as inappropriate because
[it] signal[si a lack of trust."). Studies have also shown that people are less self-focused
when they share resources with a person they love, and are less likely to engage in
bookkeeping when they are in happy relationships. See Regan, supra note 6, at 70-73
(discussing research showing that intimate relationships de-emphasize differentiation
between the self and the other in allocating resources).
25. Anderson, supra note 21, at 157; see also, e.g., Regan, supra note 6, at 11. Even in
communities where allocation on the basis of individual contribution is acceptable (such as
in some cases of limited co-ownership of property by family members or business partners),
constant monitoring of contributions and benefits is destructive to the relationship.
Monitoring behavior tends to "poison the atmosphere" and make the monitored party
more likely to abuse the communal venture. See Carol M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of
Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 531, 540 (1995). The problem is all the worse in the context of
communal marriage, where the very act of individual calculation may undermine the
community.
26. Milton Regan's example of this commonly shared intuition comes from The Joy
Luck Club. In the book, a young couple itemizes its household expenditures to ensure that
each member pays precisely his or her portion. As Regan rightly observes, most would
react to this type of arrangement with some degree of unease or embarrassment. See
Regan, supra note 6, at 22-23.
27. See Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 1255-56 (pointing to the centrality of mutual
commitment, trust, and reliance in marriage); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, "I
Only Want Trust": Norms, Trust and Autonomy 1, 7 (May 9, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (emphasizing the importance of trust,
grounded in the expectation of permanence and unconditional love, for good marriage).
Reliance is an important value in the marital context because it facilitates desirable trust
and cooperation. It is for this reason that "the protection of the reliance interest in
marriage" is "a consistent theme" in the law of marriage and divorce. Margaret F. Brinig &
June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 855, 870
(1988); cf. Hanoch Dagan, Mistakes, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1795, 1804 n.38 (2001) ("[Tlhe law
never protects reliance per se; it protects reliance if and only if there is a good reason to
encourage (or at least not discourage) the type and magnitude of the reliance at issue.").
28. Gardner, supra note 23, at 283; cf. Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow,
Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce
Law, in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, supra note 1, at 191, 199 (arguing that sharing
of individual earnings, benefits, and entitlements "encourages cooperative commitments
between spouses"). Evidence suggests that this communal ideal is widely shared. Even
spouses who do not live up to this ideal-in whose lives the magnitude of each spouse's
contribution does affect allocation-endorse it. See, e.g., Carole B. Burgoyne & Alan
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b. On Love and Loyalty. - But what about love? Focusing on com-
munity may seem to sweep close to, yet ultimately leave out, what is widely
regarded as the most important part of marriage. We do not mean to
disregard love as a crucial feature of most marriages. We exclude it from
our direct concern, however, for two reasons. First, the law cannot con-
trol love and loyalty.29 Marital property rules can only make marriages
more or less hospitable to love by changing spouses' attitudes toward
marriage or giving them reasons to act in particular ways. In a sense,
then, community is a stand-in for those aspects of love that can be con-
trolled by law. Our focus is necessarily on the aspects of marriage that law
can control-division on divorce and property governance during mar-
riage-and on the ideals that relate to them.
More importantly, we bracket love because it is good that some as-
pects of the interspousal relationship remain unregulated. While the law
can and should support interpersonal trust between spouses, if marriage
is to be a true community, the law should not entirely constitute that
trust. Sharing and interpersonal trust are promoted when one spouse
makes herself vulnerable to the other, sharing the financial and (more
importantly) emotional risks and benefits of marriage. Because the regu-
lation of love or loyalty may undermine these crucial components of com-
munal marriage, love and loyalty should be bracketed from the legal ac-
count of marriage. For this reason, we also exclude "fault"-in the sense
of emotional or sexual betrayal-from the universe of considerations that
are relevant to the division of marital property.3 0
2. Autonomy
a. Autonomy Within a Marital Community. - Marriage as an egalita-
rian liberal community demands that spouses look beyond their narrow
self-interest. But contrary to the belief of some traditional scholars, this
Lewis, Distributive Justice in Marriage: Equality or Equity?, 4 J. Comm. & Applied Soc.
Psych. 101, 112 (1994) (summarizing results of an eight-couple study in which all couples
subscribed to the ideal of equal sharing even though "this was not always easy to achieve"
and contribution factors "undermine[d] a sense of marriage as a partnership among
equals").
29. See Wardle, supra note 3, at 124.
30. Most jurisdictions have also rejected fault as a basis for property division and
alimony. See ALl Principles, supra note 8, at 43-49 (identifying twenty-two states that
consider fault for alimony purposes and fifteen that consider fault for property division
purposes). As far as emotions are concerned, there is no meaningful way to divide them
upon divorce, nor would it be desirable for the law to attempt to do so. Moreover,
compensating for these sorts of harms raises additional difficulties. Insofar as emotional
harms would, as a practical matter, have to be reduced to penalties for certain bad
actions-for instance, infidelity-the law would invariably misallocate fault in many
marriages. Should the spouse who resorts to infidelity at the end of a marriage that has
otherwise been emotionally oppressive be penalized, while her spouse is assessed no fine
for his abusive behavior? Any legal attempt to account for fault in marriage would be so
flawed as to undermine any purpose ascribed to it.
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vision does not require the negation of the self.3 1 Although altruistic
care of the other plays an important part in the meaning of marriage, the
institution does not-indeed should not-imply self-sacrifice. This
should not be interpreted as a sign of hypocrisy or half-hearted commit-
ment. As Jean Hampton has explained, selflessness, or constant self-de-
nial, is anathema to true altruism.32 While human "saints" are often re-
vered by those whom they beneficially serve, the exclusion of their
individual selves (and their own needs) from moral deliberation is cer-
tainly not required and may even be morally blameworthy. Indirectly,
self-sacrificers may be harming the very people for whom they care by
teaching "the permissibility of their own exploitation by submitting to,
and even supporting, their subservient role.
33
A liberal conception of the marital community thus views the com-
munal goods obtained through marriage as an aspect of individual self-
fulfillment,34 with that "self' properly including the new plural self of
marriage. Spouses' identification with and commitment to the marital
community should be voluntarily chosen based in part on the value of the
marital community to themselves-hence, the liberal qualifier. 35 Thus,
the plural identity constituted by marriage is only partial: Incorporating
what is good for the other into the perception of what is good for oneself
need not, and should not, erase each spouse's individual identity. In the
ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community, the community of
marriage is good for the individual spouse, rather than simply good of
her.
As we will see in discussing the scope of the marital estate, this core
aspect of individual autonomy requires limits on the collectivization of
projects individual spouses undertake during the tenure of their mar-
riage. For now, it is important to note the implications of autonomy for
exit. If the marital community is to be a good for each individual spouse,
law should secure the ability of each spouse to decide whether or not,
31. Wardle, supra note 3, at 122 ("Self-sacrifice, sharing, continuous giving, and
continual forgiving are indispensable to any happy marriage."); cf. Schneider, supra note
3, at 525-31 (noting tensions between an autonomy-based personal fulfillment approach
and traditional marriage based on permanence and dependency).
32. Jean Hampton, Selflessness and the Loss of Self, in Altruism 135, 161 (Ellen
Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1993).
33. Id. at 136, 148.
34. Both "substantive" communitarians and liberals have emphasized the importance
of collective goods. See, respectively, Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice 143 (2d ed. 1998) (emphasizing human belonging to constitutive communities and
the entailed value of social responsibility), and Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 193,
198-207 (1986) (arguing that availability of collective goods constituting social alternatives
is central to true autonomy).
35. Cf. Andrew Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community
and Their Normative Significance 23 (2000) (arguing that identification with a group and
commitment to its goals "need not be wholly non-voluntary, and may involve an element of
choice").
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and for how long, to participate in the institution. 36 While each spouse
in a communal marriage is in part constituted by her relationship with
the other, she should be able to choose to abandon, through divorce, this
part of her identity. 7 Liberal societies are accordingly committed to en-
suring that the participation of individuals in marriages (and other social
groups) is legally voluntary.
Legal entry into marriage is entirely and uncontroversially free: At
the very least, no one is legally compelled to marry.38 What is at issue in
our incorporation of autonomy into the ideal of marriage is the availabil-
ity of free exit through no-fault divorce. Exit is a bedrock liberal value. It
stands for the right to withdraw or refuse to engage; it is the ability to
dissociate, to cut oneself out of a relationship with other persons.3 " A
strong commitment to exit-to the idea of open boundaries that enable
geographical, social, familial, and political mobility-"enhances the ca-
pacity for a self-directed life, including the capacity to form, revise, and
pursue our ends."40 In marriage, as in all contexts, the availability of exit
is crucial to achieving these central goals. Impeding people from exit-
ing-either through outright prohibitions or rules that de facto prohibit
exit (including rules that impose prohibitive exit costs)-is incompatible
with the most fundamental liberal tenets. 41 Meaningful self-identification
and the goods it provides should be part of the good life for individuals,
not a legal duty that they must bear regardless of its continuing appeal.
Social pressure may of course affect people's decisions to enter or
exit marriage. Where this pressure takes the form of mere disapproval by
friends, family, and religious communities, this is not necessarily illiberal
because people can ultimately choose their own way. The law's power,
36. Gender inequality poses a special problem for the ability of legally free entry and
exit to protect against oppression. See infra Part I.A.3.
37. Cf. Mason, supra note 35, at 58-59. Mason argues that "a fully committed
member may identify with [a community] without that precluding her from reflecting
upon its fundamental values." While she "cannot at the same time critically reflect upon its
fundamental values and identify fully with it," she can "intermittently" take up "a critical
perspective on those values." Id.
The phenomenology of the decision to divorce is, we think, interpretive: A spouse
contemplating divorce considers the extent to which she is defined by her marriage, and
then evaluates herself as that person. It is at this evaluative stage ("is the married me a
good-or at least a good enough-me?") that self-interest becomes relevant.
38. Of course, not everyone is allowed to enter into marriage. We do not generally
express a view on the scope of entry. We do note, however, that the internal account of the
good marriage we have described yields no reason to exclude same-sex couples from the
institution.
39. See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 21-29 (1970).
40. Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 Legal Theory 165, 176 (1998); see also Michael
Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 Pol. Theory 6, 11-12, 15-16, 21
(1990) (discussing liberalism and its relation to social, marital, and political mobility).
41. See Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in
Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 Va. L.
Rev. 1053, 1099-1101, 1126-27 (1998) (explaining the importance of robust exit,
unconstrained by real or de facto limitations, to Rawls's political liberalism).
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however, cannot be escaped, and therefore a commitment to liberal val-
ues requires that the legal boundaries of marriage be open. Nonetheless,
social pressure is at times institutionalized in a law-like fashion (consider,
for instance, some close-knit and pervasive religious communities), mak-
ing exit practically impossible. In these contexts, we hope that an exit-
friendly law can begin to ameliorate those pressures.
Free exit does not necessarily undermine the communal nature of
marriage. 42 People marry "because of a shared commitment to each
other and the institution,' '43 and although most of them are aware of the
divorce rate, they continue to marry in large numbers. 4 4 A genuine mari-
tal community can exist even if it does not last forever. Spouses can share
the burdens and the benefits of ajoint life, even if they know that at some
point this collectivity may come to an end.
Furthermore, exit is not only passively compatible with marital com-
munity, but can actively support it. Part of what makes marriage mean-
ingful as a community is that spouses know that it is entered into and
maintained only by choice. 45 Intimacy, caring, and commitment are par-
ticularly valuable if voluntarily chosen. The legal power to exit converts
the daily life of marriage into a manifestation of a choice that positively
reaffirms spouses' plural identity.4 6
By insisting that autonomy and community are mutually reinforcing,
our account of communal marriage departs from the influential commu-
nitarian account of Milton Regan. In discussing the "internal" (roughly
communal) and "external" (roughly autonomous) stances toward mar-
riage, Regan ultimately concludes that they are locked in an irresolvable
tension.4 7 Rules must be chosen to reflect one or the other stance, and
42. But see Regan, supra note 6, at 144-45 (arguing that the no-fault divorce
paradigm adopts "primarily an external stance toward marriage" and that "[t] his discourse
tends to conceptualize ex-spouses as strangers rather than spouses"); Allen M. Parkman,
Mutual Consent Divorce, in The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce 57, 63
(Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002) (hereinafter Law and Economics of
Marriage] (arguing that no-fault divorce provides a disincentive to make sacrifices for the
benefit of the marital community); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1809-11 (1985)
(describing no-fault divorce as reducing legal support for "mutual spousal responsibility");
Wardle, supra note 3, at 124-26 (arguing that no-fault divorce undermines the
commitment necessary to form a true bond with one's partner).
43. Cahn, supra note 20, at 252.
44. Id. at 252-53.
45. Karst, supra note 20, at 637 (arguing that associational values realized through
voluntary choice require the freedom to terminate); see also Michael Walzer, Spheres of
Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 234-39 (1983) (noting that "[t]he distributive
principle of romantic love is free choice," and that "[lhove, affection, friendship,
generosity, solicitude, and respect are not only initially but also continuously, at every point
in time, matters of individual choice"); cf. Marilyn Friedman, What Are Friends For? 208
(1993) ("In our culture, friendship is a voluntary relationship .....
46. See Karst, supra note 20, at 637-38.
47. Regan, supra note 6, at 3-5 (noting "tension" between the stances and that they
are "fundamentally different orientations that are irreducible to one another").
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rough justice must be done to accommodate their competing demands.
Under our conception of these values, however, the demands of commu-
nity and autonomy are ultimately coincident.
We do not deny that the availability of exit poses a grave threat to the
functioning of the marital community. As in other commons settings,
exit tends to undermine sharing and trust by exacerbating the difficulty
of collective action, inviting opportunism, and thus threatening coopera-
tion, even in long-term relationships. 48 This difficulty is particularly
acute in marriage, where couples often make long-term, relationship-spe-
cific investments based on the assumption that their marriage will endure
for a lifetime, thus creating asymmetric vulnerability as to the contin-
gency of early termination by divorce. 49 One particularly resonant exam-
ple is the vulnerability created by "traditional" marriage, where one
spouse (the wife) makes sacrifices early in hopes of reaping rewards later
in life. 50
This does not mean that securing the communal goods of marriage
in a liberal environment is impossible. Rather, as with other liberal com-
mons institutions, the risks opened up by free exit should be taken as a
challenge. 5 1 Fortunately, there are quite a few things marriage law can
do to mitigate these difficulties. First, entrenching the ideal of marriage
as an egalitarian liberal community in marital property law can help to
internalize these values, making opportunistic behavior even less likely.
Moreover, guided by this ideal, marital property law can provide a safety
net (as discussed below) that can ameliorate the vulnerability of spouses.
And there is another possibility: making exit, though free, not necessarily
easy. Cooperative relationships are particularly vulnerable to opportunis-
tic behavior when the parties' horizon is only short term. Temporary
time-limited restraints on exit-so-called "cooling-off periods"-can alle-
viate this problem, enabling parties to engage in longer-term cooperation
and guarding against impulsive exit.5 2 Accordingly, state divorce
schemes that provide for waiting periods before divorce may-if imple-
mented carefully enough-partially counteract the difficulties exit poses
for community. 53
48. This difficulty is acute where vigilant retaliation is difficult, such as in many
situations involving the management of common resources, due to differences in payoffs
from round to round and exogenous, nonstrategic reasons to exit. See Dagan & Heller,
supra note 5, at 576-77. Both of these features are prominent in the marital community.
49. See Kay, supra note 1, at 31; Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 1264-65; see also
Ellickson, supra note 18, § I.C.2 (noting the positive correlation between the threat of exit
from a household and power).
50. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 3, 42-43 (1989)
(arguing that traditional wives invest in marriage in hope of deferred return).
51. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 5, at 574-79 (demonstrating that with proper
legal facilitation, liberal exit and community can coexist, so that securing cooperation
gains need not undermine legally free exit).
52. See id. at 598-99.
53. Covenant marriage, first adopted in Louisiana, is one well-known institution
integrating a cooling-off period. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 272-275.1, 307-309
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b. The Contribution Principle Reconsidered. - In exalting exit, we em-
brace the individual within the community of marriage. Some scholars
have argued that a liberal marriage must go even further and include a
commitment to giving each spouse what are singularly the fruits of his or
her contribution. 54 We do not dismiss the importance of the desert for
labor principle on which this view seems to rest. Liberal societies are gen-
erally committed to awarding property rights (or wages) to those who
engage in purposeful, value-creating activity. 55 But there is nothing in
the commitment to desert that requires that the deserving unit must al-
ways be an individual. Competitive markets, which exalt desert, 56 fre-
quently reward the labor of collectivities, such as corporations, partner-
ships, and joint ventures. Concomitantly, the desert for labor principle is
simply indifferent as to whether the deserving unit is the individual
spouse or the marital community.
The desert for labor principle should not guide the legal allocation
of entitlements between spouses because piercing the veil of the marital
unit in an attempt to determine individual contributions undermines
community. To be sure, even spouses who understand marriage as an
egalitarian liberal communityjustifiably expect one another to contribute
to the collectivity. Communal marriage does not require that a spouse
accept an arrangement where she is being exploited, expected to expend
a disproportionate amount of effort, and yet reaping relatively little in the
way of reward. There are, in other words, limits to acceptable asymmetric
(West 2000) (defining covenant marriage and conditions on dissolution); see also
Katherine Shaw Spaht, What's Become of Louisiana Covenant Marriage Through the Eyes
of Social Scientists, 47 Loy. L. Rev. 709, 711 (2001) (describing conditions on dissolution
of covenant marriage, including mandatory premarital counseling, taking reasonable steps
to preserve marriage, and various restrictive grounds for divorce). In a pervasive
community, however, even such soft restrictions on exit must be viewed with caution. See
Dagan & Heller, supra note 5, at 598 (noting that community enhancing exit limitations
are problematic in commons settings, such as marriage, where sharing pervades members'
lives). To the extent that covenant marriage does not allow immediate exit from
emotionally or psychologically abusive relationships, we obviously do not endorse it. See
Jeanne Louise Carriere, "It's Dj! Vu All Over Again": The Covenant Marriage Act in
Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1701, 1714-17 (1998)
(arguing that compulsory marriage counseling in covenant marriage may endanger
battered spouses).
54. See, e.g., Allen M. Parkman, Good Intentions Gone Awry: No-Fault Divorce and
the American Family 187 (2000) (arguing for property settlements on divorce based on
(economic) partnership principles); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Gender and Nonfinancial
Matters in the ALl Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DukeJ. Gender L. & Pol'y
203, 205-11 (2001) (arguing that spouses ought to be singularly compensated for their
contributions, both financial and non-financial, on divorce).
55. See Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property 149-52 (1991)
(discussing Lockean justification for property rights as reward for productive labor);
Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property 255-56, 285-87 (1990) (pointing to the
centrality of desert for labor to the justification for private property).
56. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 67-69 (1981) (advancing
desert as a justification for the use of competitive markets and for the normative
commitment to wealth maximization).
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contribution within the ideal of communal marriage. But these limits are
not based on the metric of desert for labor in the sense of each spouse
insisting upon receiving benefits in proportion to individual market-val-
ued contribution. Instead, marriage operates on a metric focused on in-
dividual effort. Though the joint endeavor need not be the product of
similar market contributions, it should be the product of similar personal
investments in the success of the marital endeavor. 57 Furthermore, the
ideal of rough long-term reciprocity of effort must be self-enforced. Ef-
fort is not measured in terms of an external criterion; determining
whether rough long-term reciprocity of effort exists in a marriage is per-
sonal to each couple, based upon their goals, beliefs, and private valua-
tions. Therefore, law should not use that standard to divide property or
to determine who may be allowed to divorce (and, of course, autonomy
demands that spouses be allowed to exit from marriage for any reason, or
no reason at all).
It may seem that substituting equal sharing for contribution would
discourage spouses from investing in marriage. However, spouses have
reasons to invest beyond the point where their investments are protected.
In part, this is simply a point about the desirability of taking risk in order
to achieve potentially greater gains. But the point is also more profound:
Certain goods, such as intimacy, commitment, and self-identification can
only exist in the face of risk. Making oneself vulnerable is a necessary
precondition to the formation of a plural self and its attendant goods.
Moreover, investing in the marriage may be necessary to stop the other
spouse from exiting. Leaving is a form of self-defense, and "[t]he possi-
bility of exit may itself make the group responsive to the interests of its
members."58 Furthermore, generous investment in the marital commu-
nity today signals the probability of similarly generous investment in the
future, and thus may cause the other spouse to reciprocate. 59 In any
event, the law should not protect every spousal investment. If spouses are
only willing to invest in a marriage because they know that their invest-
ments will be repaid, they are already outside the communal ideal. The
existence of the plural self should make spouses willing to risk their own
self-interest to some degree. Marital property law should have little inter-
est in encouraging the investment of a spouse who will only contribute
more than half the effort involved in ajoint project if she knows that she
will reap more than half the reward.
57. It is an open and difficult question whether some extreme and unexpected
disparities in market contribution (such as those arising from a sudden serious illness of
one spouse) would ever necessitate deviation from the ideal, even if the efforts of both
spouses remain constant.
58. Green, supra note 40, at 171; see also Hirschman, supra note 39, at 22-25
(describing the interaction of consumer exit and the management reaction function).
59. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103
Colum. L. Rev. 1641, 1665-67 (2003) (pointing to experimental evidence in developing a
theory of reciprocal fairness whereby "[i] n response to generous actions, many individuals
are much more cooperative than rational choice theory would predict").
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3. Equality and Non-Subordination. - People may engage in many
joint enterprises where equality is not necessary. Joint owners in a busi-
ness, for instance, may divide the ownership interest 70-30 without raising
any alarm. But it would be perverse to conceive of a marriage of this sort,
where one spouse has a recognized controlling interest in the property
that partially constitutes the marriage, and, correspondingly, in marital
decisions. One reason for this difference is that marriage is a more perva-
sive engagement than any other enterprise. 60 Disparity in the control of
marital property moves beyond simple inequality-which an individual
may rightly choose as a means to other ends-to subordination, which
systematically denies the importance of whatever ends that individual
chooses. As subordination in marriage is a threat to a spouse's basic per-
sonhood, the marital community must be bounded by a commitment to
equality.6 1
Equality as non-subordination is also crucial to the communal di-
mension of marriage. Spouses in an inegalitarian marriage cannot form
a true plural self or enjoy the unique collective goods of marriage. This
applies not only to the oppressed spouse, but also to the oppressor: "One
committed and loving partner," Elizabeth Anderson explains, "cannot
unequivocally rejoice in his life with his partner if he knows that the other
finds the relationship oppressive in some way." 62 An oppressive marriage
not only deprives the subordinated spouse of a voice, but also deprives
the subordinating spouse of a partner, thus precluding realization of inti-
macy, caring, commitment, and emotional attachment.
Yet the history of equality in marriage is not promising. The marital
community, a locus of sharing and trust, has been abused to shield subor-
dinating patriarchal structures. 6 3 Patriarchal marriages allow men to cap-
ture a disproportionately high share of the benefits (including decision-
making power) of marriage and bear a disproportionately low share of its
60. To the extent that any communal enterprise is so pervasive-for instance, in the
case of tribes or communes-the same analysis applies.
61. We do not mean to suggest that spouses should be equal in all respects. Mutual
dependency is, after all, a central aspect of marriage. Cf. Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the
Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities 197 (1985) (arguing that demands
for complete equality are misguided, as a certain amount of dependency characterizes
most personal relationships); Nock, supra note 24, at 1977-78, 1980 (describing the
interdependencies that underlie gender differences in marriage, and arguing that these
are viewed as legitimate). Rather, equality in the marital context stands for non-
subordination.
62. Anderson, supra note 21, at 151.
63. See Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 135-36, 138-39 (1989)
(arguing that marital division of labor "makes wives far more likely than husbands to be
exploited"); Cahn, supra note 20, at 246-47 (noting that traditional marital community,
reinforced by marriage law, has entailed subordination of wives); cf. Frances E. Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497, 1523
(1983) (discussing the patriarchal nature of nineteenth-century marriage).
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costS. 64 "When we look seriously at the distribution between husbands
and wives of such critical social goods as work (paid and unpaid), power,
prestige, self-esteem, opportunities for self-development, and both physi-
cal and economic security, we find socially constructed inequalities be-
tween them, right down the list."
6 5
The persistence of patriarchal marriages can be attributed to the en-
hanced leverage men have in their explicit and implicit bargaining with
women. This is due to men's greater earning power, or, more precisely,
the "cycle of power relations and decisions [that] pervades both family
and workplace, and the [way in which the] inequalities of each reinforce
those that already exist in the other."66 It can also be attributed to
"men's higher extramarital utility, better remarriage prospects, and
longer reproductive life."' 6 7 Finally, as Carol Rose explains, if women
have a greater taste for cooperation than men or if they are perceived to
have such a taste, over time men are likely to get the lion's share of the
joint gains from marriage. 68
64. See Okin, supra note 63, at 149-59 (documenting the disproportionate burden of
unpleasant housework falling on wives, even in dual wage-earning couples); Amy L. Wax,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84
Va. L. Rev. 509,519-26 (1998) (examining the inequalities plaguing women in dual-earner
marriages); Joan C. Williams, Women and Property, in A Property Anthology 256, 258-59
(Richard H. Chused ed., 2d ed. 1997) (detailing the benefits husbands enjoy at wives'
expense).
65. Okin, supra note 63, at 136. A patriarchal marriage need not be characterized by
the husband maliciously or intentionally taking advantage of the wife. Rather, we assume
that in most cases the inequitable distribution of the marital goods between the spouses is
the outcome of broader social inequities, where the choices of wives are systematically
more constrained than those of their husbands.
66. Id. at 147. Recent census bureau figures show that the gendered wage gap still
exists, even in the newest generation of workers (16-24 years of age). See U.S. Census
Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: Full-Time and Salary Workers-Number
and Earnings: 1985 to 1999, at 437 tbl.696 (2000). While some studies have lessened this
gap by factoring out variables such as willingness to have long gaps in work to care for
children, see Diana Furchtgott-Roth & Christine Stolba, Women's Figures 12-18 (1999),
many such variables are themselves products of discrimination, and therefore should not
be excluded. See Morley Gunderson, Male-Female Wage Differentials and Policy
Responses, 27 J. Econ. Lit. 46, 48-53 (1989).
67. Wax, supra note 64, at 579. Recent literature has explored the devastating
financial impact of divorce on women. See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution:
The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in
America 323-56 (1985) (describing the economic benefits to men and costs to women of
divorce); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23J. Legal
Stud. 869, 894 (1994) (same); Cahn, supra note 20, at 254 (discussing the decreased
standard of living for women following divorce under the no-fault regime); Scott & Scott,
supra note 1, at 1233, 1245-47 (noting that wives' marital investments are not adequately
protected by no-fault divorce and current divorce rules governing financial distribution);
see also Cahn, supra note 20, at 253 n.130 (collecting additional sources). The asymmetric
cost of divorce likely contributes to male dominance during marriage.
68. See Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, in
Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of Ownership 233,
245-47 (1994) [hereinafter Property and Persuasion].
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Any subordination-whether based on gender or another feature-
is problematic within marriage. However, exit and entry are sufficient for
combating subordination that does not arise from gender inequality. If
choice is otherwise unconstrained, spouses are unlikely to choose to enter
into a marriage they find oppressive, and are likely to withdraw if it be-
comes oppressive over time. 69 But with gender inequality, things are dif-
ferent. Heterosexual women cannot be expected to avoid marriage with
those who have the power to subordinate them.70 Once they have mar-
ried men, exit from a subordinating relationship will not necessarily be a
tenable alternative. 7 1
Some commentators have proposed a radical solution-giving up on
marriage altogether.72 But communal marriage is not likely to go any-
where any time soon. Because of the intense long-term fusion of mar-
riage, it is one of the few relationships that can produce the communal
goods of interpersonal trust, caring, and commitment (and few other re-
lationships promote realization of these goods to such a degree).73 For
this reason, people will continue to partner despite the lack of legal mar-
riage, but will do so without the protections against subordination that
the law can provide. Therefore, the pragmatic way to reform the relation-
ship between men and women is to change marriage, rather than make
ultimately futile attempts to erase it. 7 4
Because expecting women to protect themselves against marital sub-
ordination is both unrealistic and undesirable, the law must provide insti-
69. The availability of low-cost exit from a subordinating relationship is typically
thought to be sufficient to combat exploitation. See Goodin, supra note 61, at 197 ("As
long as the subordinate party can withdraw without severe cost, the superordinate cannot
exploit him.").
70. Some have argued that allowing same-sex marriage can make the institution itself
less oppressive. See John G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex
Marriage, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 1119, 1189 (1999) (arguing that same-sex marriage would
"boost" traditional marriage by reinforcing principles of commitment and love).
71. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love,
Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1283 (1992) (explaining why exit
may be neither a tenable nor desirable strategy for women faced with iniquitous love and
work relationships).
72. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and
Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 228-30 (1995).
73. Cf. Marsha Garrison, Toward a Contractarian Account of Family Governance,
1998 Utah L. Rev. 241, 260 (noting the centrality of family to economic organization, and
noting that familial ties, including ties between husband and wife, "have traditionally been
the focus of most individuals' emotional lives"); Norval D. Glenn, Values, Attitudes, and
the State of American Marriage, in Promises to Keep: Decline and Renewal of Marriage in
America 15, 15 (David Popenoe et al. eds., 1996) (noting that satisfactory marriage "is
more predictive of the health, happiness, and general well-being of adults" than any other
variable).
74. See Wax, supra note 64, at 636-37. For a pragmatic defense of this move in the
context of property theory generally, see Margaret Jane Radin, Lacking a Transformative
Social Theory: A Response, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 409, 422-24 (1993), and Laura S.
Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 Yale L.J. 127, 146-47 (1990).
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tutional guarantees of gender equality to support the marital community.
This prescription is not only founded on the intrinsic value of gender
equality, but is also entailed by the communal maxims of marriage. As
Susan Moller Okin explains, men's ability to use the threat of exit as lev-
erage affects the very functioning of the community by affecting women's
voice within it.75 With pervasive gender inequality, the fact that women
remain in and cooperate during marriage may be due to social, eco-
nomic, and cultural lack of choice. This is anathema to genuine
community.
Admittedly, marital property law cannot completely free women or
marriage from gender subordination. Fully compensating for all social
gender discrimination is too great an obligation to put on marriage. In
particular, expecting husbands to completely neutralize their wives' social
disadvantages mayjeopardize their own autonomy. Thus, the best we can
hope for is a reasonable compromise between these competing goals.
And yet there is hope that marital property law can help facilitate the
egalitarian transformation. In Part II, we show that a commitment to the
ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community entails a significant
legal reform: Spouses' claims to the marital estate, broadly defined,
should be based on their joint and equal entitlement, rather than on a
property redistribution theory. Through these and other reforms, we
hope that a revitalized marital property law, consistent with the ideal of
marriage as an egalitarian liberal community, will be one important-
although by no means sufficient-step toward gender equality.76
B. Law and Mariage
Assuming that our ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal commu-
nity is appealing, how can marital property law-particularly because it
operates primarily at the moment of divorce-have any impact on
whether marriages reflect that ideal? Though the role of law is admit-
tedly modest, it performs an important function in ongoing marriages.
75. See Okin, supra note 63, at 137-38, 161, 167-68, 180. By reinforcing bargaining
imbalances, men's threat of exit diminishes women's power within marriage. See June
Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L.
Rev. 359, 405 (1994) (noting that men's implicit threat of exit has contributed to women's
diminished power within marriage); Wax, supra note 64, at 544-51, 626-36 (describing the
adverse impact of bargaining disparity, partially due to men's exit threat advantage, on
women's choices within marriage). This loss of power translates into a loss of voice.
76. Some commentators have argued that inequality is endemic to marriage, and that
marriage should therefore be rejected. See, e.g., Ertman, supra note 4, at 82-83, 90-98
(putting forth a business model as an egalitarian alternative to traditional marriage). This
view underestimates the important ways in which our existing social world can serve as a
fertile source of social criticism. As Michael Walzer argues, the need to validate current
practice is potentially subversive because it requires a respectable justification. See Michael
Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism 21, 39, 43, 47-48, 61 (1987). Likewise, we
believe that by celebrating marriage (while pushing for egalitarian reforms), there is a
potentially greater opportunity to confront and overcome gender inequality than by
abandoning the institution altogether.
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We begin with the law's limits. Marital property law cannot be
deployed on a regular basis. Constant legal intervention is not likely to
facilitate cooperation, but instead will undermine the relational norms of
harmony, reciprocity, and solidarity.7 7 Furthermore, law should not at-
tempt to fully protect spouses from the collapse of the emotional core of
their relationships. 78 To be meaningful, trust should involve vulnerability
to another's power.79 Therefore, we accept law's traditional reluctance to
resolve disputes within functioning marriages.8 0
With this important caveat in mind, we must also be careful not to
overlook the role law should play in sustaining a functioning marital com-
munity, even if it necessarily operates only in the background. 8 1 Marital
property rules can provide-like other liberal commons institutions-a
formal "safety net" that minimizes incentives for opportunism, the linger-
ing threat to trust and cooperation. 8 2 The core of these background
rules, as elaborated in Part II, is the rule of equal sharing of the marital
estate broadly defined. 8 3 This rule guards spousal investments of mate-
rial-as opposed to emotional-resources against the opportunism of a
77. See Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 1285-87, 1294-95; see also Robert C. Ellickson,
Order Without Law 60-64, 69, 76, 283 (1991) (describing Shasta County residents'
community-based objections to legal controls, and arguing that close-knit groups prefer
informal controls).
78. See Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 1268-69.
79. See Annette C. Baier, Moral Prejudices 133, 137, 139 (1994); see also Regan,
supra note 6, at 25-26 (arguing that effectuating trust requires "confidence in the other as
a given").
80. For a classic exposition of this reluctance, see Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885,
888-89 (Ala. 1958). For an exception to this approach in our proposal, see infra notes
264-265 and accompanying text.
81. One indication of the importance of legal entitlements to the proper functioning
of the marital relationship is that women tend to support them. See Gwynn Davis et al.,
Simple Quarrels 62 (1994). Given the history of men abusing women's trust in the family,
it should not be surprising that women are particularly concerned with security in
marriage. But they have not chosen to pursue it through abandoning the law; rather, they
have embraced legal entitlements on divorce. Cf. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401, 405, 433
(1987) (noting the empowerment of oppressed groups through rights-assertion).
82. This paragraph uses some basic economic insights, which may be seen as
inconsistent with our emphasis on the collective nature of marital goods. While it should
not govern marital property law, economic methodology can inform legal intervention to
prevent, in certain instances, the derailment of ongoing marriages. Admittedly, much of
the nastiness in marriages does not have anything to do with the pursuit of economic self-
interest (e.g., the husband who immiserates himself in order to visit damage upon his wife
in a divorce proceeding). Nonetheless, as long as part of this nastiness arises from the
pursuit of financial self-interest, reference to economic insights can be informative. For a
discussion of the application of economic theory to family law, see Brian H. Bix,
Engagement with Economics: The New Hybrids of Family Law/Law & Economics
Thinking 2-7 (Apr. 18, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
83. The prescription to divide fruits and revenues is not, in and of itself, unique to the
marital commons. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 5, at 589 (arguing that distribution of
fruits and revenues is fundamental to all commons). But in a nonmarital liberal commons,
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defecting spouse.8 4 This rule aims to ameliorate the inevitable vulnera-
bility that is an intrinsic part of long-term relationships of trust and coop-
eration: If one party exits, the other will not be left holding the bag, at
least not entirely.85 It thus gives spouses a leg up on the trust that they
need to make their marriage work while it exists.
This function is not undermined by the fact that spouses may con-
tract around most of the marital property rules we discuss. 86 Making spe-
cific marital agreements is difficult; romance and hard-headed business
bargaining are not easily blended together, 87 which may explain why ex-
plicit contracts in the marital context are not very frequent. 88 More im-
portantly, a regime that sets the norm of equal sharing as its default and
imposes transaction costs on contracting around it forces the party who
does not share the ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community
to raise his objections and convince his spouse to opt out. All legal re-
gimes, of course, force some potential spouses to reveal their prefer-
ences.8 9 But there is an important value in imposing such a burden on
the spouse who disfavors equal sharing 9 0-sharing is both meritorious
these fruits and revenues are usually divided in proportion to each owner's contribution.
In a marital community, these shares are necessarily equal.
84. Cf. id. at 577-79 (noting that law can supply mechanisms that guard against
opportunism in commons settings).
85. As we have argued above, because communal marriage stands for the ideal of
sharing both the difficulties and advantages of joint life, rather than of efficient
investments or deserved compensation, marital property law need not protect all spousal
investments.
86. But cf. Silbaugh, supra note 54, at 204-05 (noting ALl limitations on prenuptial
agreements justified on the basis of promoting certain policies).
87. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in
Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, supra note 1, at 130, 141-43 (arguing that because
marriage is more about love than business bargaining, "there is reason to fear that many
individuals would not insist upon terms that would sufficiently protect themselves").
88. See supra note 12 (noting prenuptial agreements in roughly five percent of first-
time marriages and twenty percent of remarriages).
89. Because the initial allocation of entitlements typically affects parties' preferences,
it will tend to burden those who would otherwise prefer a different allocation. See Russell
Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of
Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1583, 1602 (1998) (citing empirical
evidence showing that the initial allocation of entitlements affects preferences for these
entitlements); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
Cornell L. Rev. 608, 675 (1998) ("Contracting parties may view the default term-the term
that will govern the parties if they fail to contract for an explicit term-as a status quo
endowment. Because individuals tend to prefer the status quo to alternative states, they
are likely to prefer the default term, whatever it may be, to other options, all other things
being equal.").
90. Notice that even if one were to consider only transaction costs, special attention
should be given to the costs to those for whom bargaining out of the default is expensive.
See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1842, 1864-65, 1878 (1991). Insofar as the
preference for equal sharing is more prevalent among women, and the effort to realize this
preference in a culture that tends to find desert-based claims obviously justified may be
prohibitively costly, the choice of equal sharing as the default rule is merited.
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(because it leads to a trusting marriage) and risky (because it makes one
vulnerable to the opportunistic behavior of the other).91 Setting equal
sharing as the default regime diminishes these vulnerabilities by forcing
potential partners who do not intend to share equally to reveal their con-
ception of marriage before the potentially vulnerable party detrimentally
relies on her commitment to marriage as an egalitarian liberal
community. 9 2
In addition to its protective and facilitative role, the law can have an
expressive impact; it can help entrench the ideal of the egalitarian liberal
community in the social understanding of the institution. A supportive
marital property law can demonstrate the good that can come from mari-
tal community and what is necessary to achieve this goal.9 3 This expres-
sive function is not accomplished by hollow rhetoric; a regime of equal
sharing ensures that the material consequences of marriage reflect the
lessons the law is trying to teach.
We do not claim that most spouses act upon the particular details of
marital property law, which are, for the most part, unknown to them,9 4
and furthermore are seen as inappropriate for daily application during a
91. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory,
Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, in Property and Persuasion, supra note 68, at 25,
30-37, 40-41 (describing "Mom," who makes sacrifices for the common good by favoring
greater joint utility over individual wealth maximization, as the "heroine" of various group
thought experiments).
92. Stated a different way, equal sharing is a desirable default because it is
information-forcing. More precisely, it forces the spouse who demands a contract that is
more self-interested than the default to reveal something about his unobservable "type" to
the other spouse. See Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of
Contract Law, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. LJ. 389, 390-91 & n.3 (1993) (noting that information-
forcing default rules incentivize disclosure and alert parties, who do not protest, to the
relevance of important issues). In commercial settings there is a concern that such
information forcing might deter efficient contracting out by parties who wish to maintain
the benefit of private information. See Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and
Signaling, 23 RAND J. Econ. 432, 432-33 (1992) (arguing that the failure to contract out
may be due to the desire to maintain an asymmetric information advantage). But surely
this concern is less acute in the context of marriage.
93. We do not deny the limits of law's cultural effects. The dynamics of the
interaction between law and culture is still a puzzle, which we obviously do not purport to
solve here. We only make the modest claim that legal rules can reinforce desirable social
norms. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 2, at 94-95, 110-13 (arguing that recognizing
restitution claims of good Samaritans may have a positive impact on social behavior);
Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585, 585-86 (1998)
(explaining in economic terms the law's ability to shape or reinforce social norms). Of
course, broad resistance to law's ideals may yield counterproductive outcomes. Lacking
perfect information about law's cultural effects, one cannot deny such a possibility.
However, we see no reason to suspect a moral backlash that would undermine the
intended effect of the reforms we propose in this Article.
94. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 Law &
Hum. Behav. 439, 441-45 (1993) (concluding from a survey of marriage license applicants
that "those who are about to be married have largely incorrect perceptions of the legal
terms of the marriage contract as embodied in divorce statutes").
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functioning marriage. 9 5 But to the extent that law can ever affect social
understandings,9 6 marital law is at the center of public awareness and
debate. 97 Moreover, many parties to ongoing marriages have themselves
been divorced, or are at least intimately familiar with the divorce of a
close friend or relative. While most spouses may not know all of the legal
details, they may be affected by their accumulated impact: the exper-
iences, practices, and social expectations generated by the principles un-
derlying the legal dogma.98
II. MARITAL PROPERTY LAW
Assessing the desirability of the egalitarian liberal community ideal
for marriage requires not only abstract discussion of principles, but also
95. Our proposal includes both rules regarding division on divorce and rules
regarding governance. It may seem that, because they deal with functioning marriages, the
latter are unlikely to have any impact, expressive or behavioral, on marriage, and that in
any event governance should be a matter of private ordering. See J. Thomas Oldham,
Management of the Community Estate During an Intact Marriage, Law & Contemp.
Probs., Spring 1993, at 99, 101-04, 116-17; Scott & Scott, supra note 1, passim. The legal
regime may be self-enforcing or substituted by informal norms, but a judicial forum for
relief is nonetheless required as a safety net for those pathological cases in which these
nonlegal avenues do not provide adequate protection of a spouse's interests. Garrison,
supra note 73, at 267 & n.142. Furthermore, public prescriptions regarding family
governance are significant in providing an important public signaling of the proper
allocation of goods, responsibilities, and power between spouses. See id. at 254 ("The
distribution of power and resources within the family will also mirror . . . those of the
larger community. It is no accident that, in societies with a tradition of male supremacy,
families typically discriminate against their female members. Nor is it mere chance that
hierarchical societies tend toward hierarchical families." (footnotes omitted)). Thus,
governance rules affect marriage exactly like division rules-both provide a safety net and
express a view of the good marriage.
96. See Sean E. Brotherson & Jeffrey B. Teichert, Value of the Law in Shaping Social
Perspectives on Marriage, 3 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 23, 28-30 (2001) ("The pragmatic value of
the law in establishing sanctions or penalties for the breaking of prescribed rules of
conduct sets a baseline for appropriate behavior."); Garrison, supra note 73, at 241-43
(arguing that family law is "constitutional" in that it delimits "the offices, powers, and rights
of individual family members," so that ultimately the terms of family governance "rest to a
substantial extent on public prescription"); see also Dagan, supra note 2, at 112-13
(discussing the limits of the expressive role of law).
97. See Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 107 (1987)
("[Tihe imaginative portrayal of family life and ethics in divorce law reaches deeply into
our culture-as the law is transmitted in lawyers' offices; in courtrooms; in television news,
documentaries, and dramas; in newspapers and popular magazines; and in the cinema.");
Brotherson & Teichert, supra note 96, at 30 ("The law has . . . become the great
battleground for moral and cultural transitions.").
98. See Paul Horton & Lawrence Alexander, Freedom of Contract and the Family: A
Skeptical Appraisal, in The American Family and the State 229, 249-50 (Joseph R. Peden &
Fred R. Glahe eds., 1986) (noting that even minor regulatory modifications "have been
perceived by many to have had a profound effect on the stability" of the marital
institution); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 Va.
L. Rev. 1901, 1923-24 (2000) ("The couple comes to expect of each other and of
themselves what their social community seems to expect of married couples.").
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an analysis of the implications of these prescriptions for marital property
law. 99 Therefore, we now shift from theory to practice, to translate the
ideal into a set of detailed rules. In Part I, we discussed the rules regard-
ing exit. We endorsed no-fault divorce with perhaps a cooling-off period.
Part II focuses on aspects of marriage and divorce law that address the
property relationship between spouses: the rules regarding property divi-
sion and alimony upon divorce, as well as those addressing the govern-
ance of property during marriage.l0 ° We find that the law already re-
flects the ideal of the egalitarian liberal community to a significant
degree. At the same time, we point to blemishes in the existing doctrine,
some of which are very significant in their effects. In these contexts, we
rely on the ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community as a
justification for important reforms.
A. Property Division
1. A Note on Terminology. - We should note at the outset our use of
the categories of property division and alimony. One understanding of
these two categories is formal-property division is what a party goes
home with at the end of the divorce proceeding, while alimony is what
comes in periodic checks later.10 1 We use property division and alimony
to signify different substantive considerations: Property division is back-
ward-looking (looking at the marital relationship while it existed), while
alimony reflects the law's concern with the post-divorce financial situa-
tion of the parties, their future needs, and their prospective abilities.
10 2
Keeping in mind this conceptual framework can help avoid confusion,
because each substantive concern can be addressed by either form. 10 3 Di-
99. In other words, as lawyers and pragmatists, we are committed to pay attention
both to the particular contexts of specific doctrinal questions and to the motivating
principles and policies underlying their resolution. Cf. Don Herzog, Without Foundations:
Justification in Political Theory 223, 231-33 (1985) (insisting that abstract views must be
evaluated "by examining their concrete implications"). The top-down structure of this
Article is purely expositional; any valuable legal analysis needs to have both the "top" and
the "down."
100. While those taking other approaches to family law-notably traditionalists,
economists, and radical feminists-may each join some of our recommendations in this
Part, they will not endorse them entirely. As previously argued, each of these approaches
typically focuses on one aspect of marriage to the relative exclusion of others
(traditionalists to community, economists to autonomy, feminists to equality). See supra
notes 3-4 and accompanying text. Our vision necessarily depends on the combination of
all three components.
101. See ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 4.07 cmt. a, at 694-95.
102. But see Joan M. Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support:
Searching for Solutions to the Mystery, 23 Fam. L.Q. 253, 256-57 (1989) (arguing that
both property division and alimony should be designed to allocate benefits and burdens of
marriage fairly).
103. Historically, they may have been more aligned. See Suzanne Reynolds, The
Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need,
56 Fordham L. Rev. 827, 831-37 (1988) ("Early in the history of divorce provisions in
separate property states, some of these jurisdictions authorized the division of property to
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vision of certain resources that we perceive as presently existing marital
property-such as a family home where the children continue to live-
may only be feasible (or desirable) in installment form.10 4 Conversely,
concerns about future financial disparity (substantive alimony) may be
reflected by formal property division-for instance, through granting
complete ownership of the family home to the spouse with lower earning
potential. 10 5
2. Equal Division. - The cornerstone of the contemporary law of
marital property-the one rule that seems least disputed (at least as a
theoretical matter) by courts, commentators, and lay people alike-is the
rule of equal division upon divorce. Equal division is a relative latecomer
to marital property law, but by now we can hardly think of the law without
it. 10 6
Equal division of the marital estate has been endorsed as a rigid
mandatory prescription in only three jurisdictions. 0 7 Elsewhere equality
effectuate an award of alimony." (footnotes omitted)). Mary Ann Glendon has criticized
the movement to divide earning potential on divorce as simply collecting alimony under a
different name. See Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property 66-68
(1981). Under our analysis, Glendon's characterization fails to consider the different
substantive considerations addressed by division of earning capacity and alimony.
104. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (N.J. 1982) (introducing the
concept of reimbursement alimony-time-limited payments to the spouse who contributed
to the other's degree). There are difficulties with the post-divorce periodic form. See
Allen M. Parkman, The ALI Principles and Marital Quality, 8 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y
157, 163-66 (2001) (arguing that periodic payments "can be unfair and inefficient").
105. See, e.g., Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act, Prefatory Note, 9A pt. I U.L.A. 161
(1998) ("Because of its property division provisions, the Act does not continue the
traditional reliance upon maintenance as the primary means of support for divorced
spouses."); Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 535-36 (stating that property should be divided to reflect,
in part, spouses' different capacities and earning potential).
106. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Marital Property Treatment of Pensions, Disability
Pay, Workers' Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutes: An Insurance, or
Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1250, 1251 & n.4 (1986) (noting equal division in
fifteen states and observing the general movement toward equal division); Martha L.
Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 Wis.
L. Rev. 789, 836-39 (noting the recent introduction of equal division in Wisconsin);
Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: Would Adoption of the ALI
Principles Improve Current Outcomes?, 8 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 119, 124 (2001)
('judges thus appear to gravitate strongly toward an equal division norm even in states that
have no statutory or case law preferring such an outcome."); Marsha Garrison, How Do
Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74
N.C. L. Rev. 401, 452-55 (1996) (discussing a study of judicial outcomes evidencing the
rise of the equal division norm); Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault
Divorce Law, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 291, 299-304 (1987) (discussing introduction of equal division
in California in 1969); Reynolds, supra note 103, passim (discussing equitable distribution
statutes).
107. See Cal. Fam. Code § 2550 (West 1994); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2801 (4) (b) (West
1997); Michelson v. Michelson, 520 P.2d 263, 266 (N.M. 1974).
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typifies the law in softer ways.10 8 Many states have a presumption of equal
division of property established either through statute1 09 or through com-
mon law rule. 11 Several other states have adopted less powerful fifty-
percent "starting points" for division. 1' Even states that have failed to
adopt an equality standard, or that explicitly reject the notion,' 12 pre-
sume equal ownership ofjointly held property (typically the family home,
the only significant existing marital asset in most cases 1), regardless of
the origin of the purchase money.' 14 The "substantial evidence" needed
108. See ALl Principles, supra note 8, § 4.09 cmt. a, at 733 (discussing states
incorporating equal division presumptions and informal applications of the equal division
rule).
109. These include Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a) (1) (A)
(Michie 2002); Idaho Code § 32-712(1)(a) (Michie 2000); Ind. Code Ann. § 31-15-7-5
(Michie 1997); Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.150(1)(b) (1998); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 458:16a(II)
(1992); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c) (2001); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.105(1)(f) (1990); W. Va.
Code Ann. § 48-7-101 (Michie 2001); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 767.255(3) (West 2001).
110. These include Arizona, Illinois, and Michigan. See Toth v. Toth, 946 P.2d 900,
903 (Ariz. 1997); In re Marriage of Minear, 679 N.E.2d 856, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997);
Byington v. Byington, 568 N.W.2d 141, 146-47 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). This appears to be
developing in Hawaiian law, in light of two recent decisions by the Hawaii Intermediate
Court of Appeals. See Jackson v. Jackson, 933 P.2d. 1353, 1366 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997)
(applying Partnership Model Division under which certain categories of marital property
are divided equally); Epp v. Epp, 905 P.2d 54, 57 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing the
Partnership Model and enumerating factors meriting (and not meriting) deviation from
Partnership Model Division).
111. A presumption places a greater burden on the party arguing for deviation than a
starting point. See Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property § 8.02, at 556-57
(2d ed. 1994). At least three states use a fifty-percent starting point: Florida, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania. See Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491, 493-94 (Fla. 1991); Booth v.
Booth, 541 N.E.2d 1028, 1031 (Ohio 1989); LaBuda v. LaBuda, 503 A.2d 971, 974-75 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986). It is unclear whether Alaska employs an equal division presumption or a
starting point. See, e.g., Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568, 574-75 (Alaska 1983)
(referring to equal division as both a presumption and starting point).
112. These include Alabama, Colorado, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New York,
Virginia, and Washington, as well as the District of Columbia. See Marshall v. Marshall,
392 So. 2d 226, 227 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Goldin v. Goldin, 923 P.2d 376, 381 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1996); Herron v. Herron, 573 S.W.2d 342, 343-44 (Ky. 1978); Pederson v. Pederson,
644 A.2d 1045, 1046-47 (Me. 1994); Alston v. Alston, 629 A.2d 70, 74-75 (Md. 1993);
Patricia B. v. Steven B., 588 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (App. Div. 1992); O'Loughlin v.
O'Loughlin, 458 S.E.2d 323, 324 (Va. Ct. App. 1995); Glorfield v. Glorfield, 617 P.2d 1051,
1053 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); Burwell v. Burwell, 700 A.2d 219, 223 (D.C. 1997).
113. See Peter M. Moldave, Comment, The Division of the Family Residence Acquired
with a Mixture of Separate and Community Funds, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1263, 1263 (1982) ("The
division of the family residence upon marital dissolution is a critical issue for many divorce
litigants, in part because often much of a family's wealth is invested in that single asset.").
114. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550, 555 (Alaska 1990); Lofton v. Lofton, 745
S.W.2d 635, 637 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988); Husband TN.S. v. Wife A.M.S., 407 A.2d 1045, 1047
(Del. 1979); Robertson, 593 So. 2d at 494; Conrad v. Bowers, 533 S.W.2d 614, 619-21 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975); Parsons v. Parsons, 476 N.Y.S.2d 708, 709 (App. Div. 1984); McLean v.
McLean, 374 S.E.2d 376, 378 (N.C. 1988); Chastain v. Posey, 665 P.2d 1179, 1182-83
(Okla. 1983); Madden v. Madden, 486 A.2d 401, 404-05 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Quinn v.
Quinn, 512 A.2d 848, 853 (R.I. 1986); Trimnal v. Trimnal, 339 S.E.2d 869, 870-71 (S.C.
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to overcome such a presumption is rarely forthcoming-most couples do
not discuss the ownership of the home in the event of divorce at the time
of purchase-and, absent considerations involving housing of the
couple's children, the value of the family home is frequently divided
equally. 115
3. Tormented Explanations. - While equality is the emerging norm in
the law of property division, its underlying justification is far from settled.
The American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles of Family Dissolution Law,
which adopts the equal division rule,' 16 exemplifies the confusion. As
the ALI notes, many have supported equal division on the basis of contri-
bution theory, arguing that equal division accurately values the contribu-
tions of non-market work (typically expended disproportionately by wo-
men) to the joint marital enterprise. 1 7 The ALI rightly rejects this
argument because of its factual implausibility-there is little reason to
believe that the non-market contributions of the spouse with less market
power are sufficient to balance the other spouse's significant market
power advantage."18 But then the ALI makes an inconsistent concession
to contribution theory-that an equal division rule may in fact reflect
contributions to the entire marital relationship, because "[o]ne spouse
may have contributed more than the other in emotional stability, opti-
1986); Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W.2d 849, 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Whiting v. Whiting,
396 S.E.2d 413, 419 (W. Va. 1990); Trattles v. Trattles, 376 N.W.2d 379, 382-83 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1985). But see Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.3(A) (3) (f)-(g) (Michie 2000) (stating that
non-gift joint property retraceable to separate funds is not transmuted into marital
property).
115. See Turner, supra note 111, § 6.25, at 435-42.
116. ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 4.09, at 732.
117. See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 103, at 63 (arguing that equality is a convenient
and predictable rule-of-thumb for contribution "without substantial demerit"); Martha
Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American Law and
Society, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 387, 397 (discussing generally that allocation of marital wealth
to women has been justified by reference to contribution: "[I]t is the contribution they
have made to the family that justifies their partnership share at dissolution."). Feminists
embrace the partnership model because it better recognizes women's contributions to
marriage. See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 18, at 109-10 (noting that the idea of equal
exchange requires that we focus on the non-monetary contributions of women to
compensate for their market disadvantage); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender
Justice, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 1103, 1114 (1989) (discussing equality as the rule under the
"investment partnership theory of marriage"). But see Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership
Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 693-94 (1990)
(finding equal division unjust and advocating greater compensation for women's non-
market work and marital sacrifices).
118. See ALl Principles, supra note 8, § 4.09 cmt. c, at 735. The ALl does not discuss
the often-reported statistic that women who work outside the home also tend to do a larger
percentage of domestic work. See Wax, supra note 64, at 520 n.18 (describing studies
showing that women in dual-earner couples do more domestic work). The greater number
of hours that wives work can lessen the market gap somewhat, but given the relative low
market value of domestic work, it seems unlikely to equalize market contributions
consistently.
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mism, or social skills."' 1,9 This, however, is no more factually defensible
than the presumption of equal financial contribution. Are we to assume
that women, with less market power, must necessarily have more interper-
sonal skills?
The problem with the ALI's explanation is that it ultimately depends
on assigning an external value to each spouse's contribution, suggesting
that on some meaningful external calculation, both spouses would inevi-
tably come out equal. This is wrong not only because it is wishful think-
ing-assuming, to a certain extent, background gender equality-but
also because it misunderstands the metric of marriage. As discussed
above, spouses do keep some rough idea of the fairness of their marriage,
but this is not based on the external value of their contributions, but
rather on a rough assessment of mutual fairness that can only be inter-
nally measured and must be self-enforced. By relying on an external valu-
ation of market and non-market contribution, the ALI fails to account for
the communal character of marriage. 120
A similar response is appropriate for other dubious explanations for
the equal division rule. Elizabeth and Robert Scott have argued that
equal division of marital assets can be justified on grounds of efficiency-
and is thus firmly grounded in spouses' hypothetical consent-as a means
of preserving the incentive to share during marriage, as well as the incen-
tive to exit the marital community at certain strategically valuable
points.1 21 But even these authors admit that this contractual logic can
only justify recovery to the extent of the opportunity costs of the non-
propertied spouse. 12 2 Realistically, when parties enter the marriage with
substantially differing degrees of market power, equal division is not nec-
essary to secure the advantages of collective action.
4. Justifying Equal Division. - Instead of reference to contribution,
efficiency, or hypothetical consent, we propose a justification for the
equal division rule based on the ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal
community. First, equal division performs a desirable expressive func-
tion. Equality stands against any investigation into the interior function-
ing of the marital community to determine individual desert, and best
demonstrates that no party is any more entitled to marital resources than
119. ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 4.09 cmt. c, at 735.
120. The ALI's other explanations for the equal division rule are equally
disappointing. It maintains that "[o]nce the principle that both spouses have claims to the
marital property is accepted, dividing that property equally between them is the allocation
that least requires justification. It is difficult to offer a convincing rationale for any other
percentage." Id. § 4.09 cmt. b, at 734. Somewhat similarly, the ALI presents equal division
as "a rough compromise between the competing claims of contribution and need." Id.
These explanations are unsatisfactory as they present equal division, at best, as an arbitrary
choice or a rough and ready numerical proxy for a mismatch norm. At one point it seems
that the ALl endorses a sharing-based justification, but then it holds back by arguing that
"[s]pouses can share ... without necessarily sharing equally." Id.
121. Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 1271-73.
122. Id. at 1273-74.
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any other.128 Equal division also decreases parties' incentives to view
their marriages individualistically. A fifty percent rule ensures that there
is no advantage to keeping an accounting of individual investments in
and returns from the marital relationship. The party who shows up in
divorce court with a stack of receipts tracing back to the beginning of the
marriage has clearly not signed on to a communal understanding of the
institution.1 2 4 A rule of equal property division on divorce discourages
such behavior. Moreover, equal division makes it easier for spouses to
engage in sharing behavior-investing in relationship-specific goods, spe-
cializing, and making individual sacrifices for the overall good of the
community. 125 Spreading the benefits and the risks of this kind of behav-
ior equally between the parties transforms personal sacrifice into joint
endeavor.
Some argue that an individual investment model actually supports the
marital community because it encourages spouses to invest by removing
risk. 126 But not all investments in marriage are good ones. A contribu-
tion-based rule encourages the investment of those who are only willing
to invest knowing that they will reap a proportionate share of the rewards.
Though it may be a way of encouraging efficient investment among some
spouses, 127 it is incompatible with the idea of a marital community. As we
have previously argued, individualistic contribution accounting is anti-
thetical to the communitarian sharing principle and is not required by
the liberal commitment to autonomy.
Contribution-based rules should also be rejected because they
threaten to reinforce problematic gender roles. Due to (unjustified) dif-
ferences in market earning power, in most marriages it is efficient for the
123. For this reason we are careful not to use the term marital "partnership." Not all
partnerships are sharing partnerships. Some (maybe most) uses of the term signify quite
the opposite of the egalitarian liberal marital community we endorse: an economic
partnership. See Regan, supra note 6, at 145 (presenting a view of marriage as an
economic partnership emphasizing reward proportionate to spousal contribution); Rhode
& Minow, supra note 28, at 199 (explaining the ideal of marriage as a partnership entailing
distribution according to contribution and need); cf. Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as
Partnership, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1251, 1252 (1998) (noting that the partnership model
emphasizes the individual over community). Even "equal contribution" partnerships are
economic (they simply insist on assuming equal contributions) and thus anathema to the
egalitarian liberal community. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 117, at 396 (arguing for
marriage as an equal partnership based on the assumption of equal contribution).
124. See Regan, supra note 6, at 11 ("Genuine intimacy seems to require [that] the
relationship is taken as a given without reference to individual costs and benefits.").
125. See Kay, supra note 1, at 30-31; Rhode & Minow, supra note 28, at 199.
126. E.g., Ellman, supra note 50, at 51; see also Arthur B. Cornell, Jr., When Two
Become One, and Then Come Undone: An Organizational Approach to Marriage and Its
Implications for Divorce Law, 26 Fain. L.Q. 103, 123 (1992) (noting that compensation for
individual losses provides further incentives to work for marriage).
127. But cf. Schneider, supra note 1, at 218-19 (attacking the focus on "optimization
of family income" as a primary marital objective).
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woman to work less in the market and more inside the home.128 Contri-
bution schemes may exacerbate inequality by encouraging such speciali-
zation, thus posing a threat to marital community. 129 Equal division, by
contrast, spreads the risks of spouses' own sharing choices without aiming
to encourage any particular choice. 130 Equal division does not necessa-
rily discourage spouses from choosing gender-role specialization.1 ' But it
avoids channeling women to their traditional non-market roles.
Moreover, equal division can play a limited but significant role in
achieving egalitarian marriage by partly ameliorating men's greater mar-
ket advantages.1 32 We do not deny that women are still not on an eco-
nomic par with men, even if granted half of the assets of the marriage.1 33
It is for this reason that we shortly turn to substantive alimony as a means
to further address gender inequality. Still, even in terms of gender ine-
quality, equal division has real advantages. Division of existing marital
assets sends a powerful message of ownership-that the award is not a
social welfare handout, but rather an entitlement. 134 Unlike alimony,
128. See Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family 23 (1981); Allen M. Parkman, No-
Fault Divorce: What Went Wrong? 28 (1992); Ellman, supra note 50, at 46; Elisabeth M.
Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7J. Legal Stud. 35, 40-41 (1978). For a critique of the use
of efficiency to set gender-specialized marriage roles, see Jana B. Singer, Alimony and
Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82
Geo. L.J. 2423, 2429-32 (1994); Sugarman, supra note 87, at 144-45.
129. Cf.June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology,
Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 953, 988 (1991) (describing the
traditionalist view that protects spouses' expectation interests and thus encourages
specialization); Sugarman, supra note 87, at 145 (noting objections to specialization
grounded in gender equality concerns). By promoting specialization, these schemes
endorse sex-segregation, which is profoundly unfair to women as individuals, and
undermines the marital community. See Steven L. Nock & Margaret F. Brinig, Weak Men
and Disorderly Women: Divorce and the Division of Labor, in Law and Economics of
Marriage, supra note 42, at 171, 174-88 (presenting data showing that marriages become
more unstable when either partner spends more time in traditionally female household
chores and that stability depends on the perceived fairness of division of labor).
130. Cf. Schneider, supra note 1, at 220 (criticizing rules that favor one form of
sharing over others in the context of alimony).
131. See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce
and Its Aftermath, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 77-89 (1987) (noting that gender specialization is
often chosen for non-financial reasons). Actively discouraging women from choosing non-
market roles is problematic since it forces certain women to make choices simply because
they are good for women as a class. Cf. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765, 792 (1997) (arguing that the liberal conception ofjustice may have
to allow for voluntarily chosen gender specialization).
132. See Olsen, supra note 63, passim; Rhode & Minow, supra note 28, at 199.
133. See Fineman, supra note 106, passim (describing reasons for financial inequality
between men and women in the divorce context); Okin, supra note 63, at 162 (noting that
in most divorces women bear post-divorce childrearing duties resulting in greater
economic need).
134. See Okin, supra note 63, at 181; see also Joyce Davis, Enhanced Earning
Capacity/Human Capital: The Reluctance to Call It Property, 17 Women's Rts. L. Rep.
109, 114 (1996) (noting the shift in the legal conception of marriage from status to
entitlement: "[W]omen ... were entitled to an equitable share of the marital assets, not
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which carries the stigma of dependency and weakness, 13 5 equal division
promotes spouses' sense of personal dignity by signaling equal ownership
of all marital property. 13 6
Identifying the most compelling justification for the equal division
rule is not just a theoretical exercise. As usual, getting the theory right
has important practical implications. Understanding the point of the
central rule of marital property helps us understand and evaluate other
less central rules, at times providing reasons to reform them. Moreover,
even with respect to the equal division rule itself, understanding its justifi-
cation suggests its proper application. If, as we argue, equal division is
best explained as a rejection of contribution and an endorsement of egal-
itarian liberal community, then it is better applied as a presumption (and
a strong one, at that) rather than a starting point. It should also apply to
all marital property (the scope of which we discuss below) rather than
simply the family home or any other subset. Furthermore, this presump-
tion should never be rebutted by any factor relating to contribution, as
this would undermine the very point of its existence.
B. The Assets Subject to Division
As important as the rules governing property division are the assets
that are subject to these rules: the "scope" of marital property. The
equal division rule cannot support an egalitarian liberal community if im-
portant marital assets are excluded from division. 13 7
We include the central cases, such as existing balances from wages
earned during marriage, property purchased and investments made with
these marital funds, as well as the slightly more controversial category of
wage substitutes such as pensions.'38 We exclude from the scope of mari-
tal property many of those things that have traditionally been excluded-
for instance, the emotional trauma of divorce.' 39 We restrict our efforts
because they were dependent, but because they had earned it."). To emphasize the
ownership message, Okin has even gone so far as to recommend that employers issue two
separate and equally divided paychecks, one to each spouse. Okin, supra note 63, at 181.
While this suggestion clearly undermines our vision of the collective nature of the marital
endeavor, Okin has made an important point about ownership. Perhaps a single paycheck
made out in the joint names of both spouses would be appropriate.
135. See Singer, supra note 117, at 1117.
136. See Davis, supra note 134, at 143.
137. For instance, the ALI notes that states with equal division rules typically fail to
include many categories of property in the division. See ALl Principles, supra note 8, at 23
(noting that strong presumptions of equal division are usually accompanied by limitations
on inclusion of inherited property, preexisting property, and professional degrees and
licenses within the marital estate).
138. This is the ALI's preferred rule, ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 4.08, at 712-13,
and the justification for inclusion-that no principled distinction exists between these
assets and wages earned during marriage-has elsewhere been persuasively given. See,
e.g., Blumberg, supra note 106, passim (discussing different asset types and providing
reasons for their inclusion in the marital estate).
139. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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to fungible goods, focusing on three controversial types: earning capac-
ity, preexisting property, and gifts and inheritances. Remaining inequi-
ties on the interpersonal plane are properly beyond the scope of the law.
1. Increased Earning Capacity. - One of the most contested, and most
important, issues in marital property law is the proper division of a
spouse's future earning potential gained during marriage. 140  This is
commonly called the "professional degree" problem, based on one way
this earning potential is generated. But there is no reason to so confine
the category; instead, it should extend to future earning potential gener-
ated during the time of marriage, however derived. 1 4 1
Currently, most jurisdictions refuse to include increased earning ca-
pacity within the marital estate. 14 2 In fact, only New York has a clearly
established rule making at least some of this asset-professional degrees
obtained during marriage-eligible for division. t 43 Nor does the ALI rec-
ommend making such property divisible. 14 4 Both state rules and the ALI
compensate for this omission in other ways, primarily by making earning
capacity changes relevant to alimony. But as we will show, these methods
of dividing earning capacity are inadequate. A commitment to the ideal
140. Sugarman, supra note 87, at 149; see also Davis, supra note 134, at 115-16
(noting importance of human capital as asset of divorcing couple and discussing
unsuccessful attempts to characterize future earning potential as marital property).
141. Lenore Weitzman has referred to increased earning capacity as a "career asset."
Weitzman, supra note 67, at 110 (defining "career assets" as "tangible and intangible assets
that are acquired as a part of either spouse's career or career potential," including
professional licenses, benefits, insurance, and "entitlements to company goods and
services"). Likewise, professional goodwill should be included in the marital estate. See id.
In many jurisdictions, this is already the case. See ALl Principles, supra note 8, § 4.07 cmt.
d, at 699 (suggesting that professional goodwill is typically treated as marital property).
142. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978); In re Marriage
of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 60 (Iowa 1989); Drapek v. Drapek, 503 N.E.2d 946, 949 (Mass.
1987); Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (N.H. 1983); Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15, 17
(Pa. 1986); Becker v. Perkins-Becker, 669 A.2d 524, 530 (R.I. 1996). But see Postema v.
Postema, 471 N.W.2d 912, 915-16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (noting the unsettled treatment
of advanced degrees, but stating that most appellate panels have found that "fairness
dictates that a spouse who did not earn an advanced degree be compensated whenever the
advanced degree is the end product of a concerted family effort involving mutual sacrifice
and effort by both spouses" (emphasis omitted)).
143. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713-14, 716 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a
medical license earned during marriage is marital property and stating generally that "an
interest in a profession or professional career potential is marital property which may be
represented by direct or indirect contributions of the non-title-holding spouse, including
financial contributions and non-financial contributions made by caring for the home and
family"). The O'Brien court actually went too far. "[B]y including the present value of the
physician's entire future earning stream in the value of the marital asset, [it] included
value that was partly attributable to future professional experience, skill development, and
seniority." Scott & Scott, supra note 1, at 1322. Encumbering spouses' future career
choices in such a way is inconsistent with a commitment to no-fault divorce.
144. ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 4.07(1)-(2), at 694 ("Spousal earning capacity...
[is] not marital property. Occupational licenses and educational degrees are not marital
property.").
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of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community requires treating spouses'
increased earning capacity as marital property, while tailoring property
division rules to address the unique features of this asset. Because in
many marriages, increased earning capacity is the only asset of any signifi-
cant value, this proposal may be the most important reform we
recommend.
The joint creation of careers is often one of the most important
projects of marriage. Therefore, excluding earning capacity from the
marital estate "makes a mockery of the equal division rule." 14 5 It also
exploits the spouse whose acceptance of burdens on behalf of the com-
munal endeavor is transformed by the law into self-sacrifice. Additionally,
where this spouse is the wife (the majority case), and a "traditional" wife
at that, excluding increased earning capacity compounds the effects of
pervasive gender inequality. 1 46
To a limited extent, existing alimony law already reflects these con-
cerns. The ALI, echoing the rules of individual states, makes earning ca-
pacity relevant to the compensation spouses receive in some marriages of
long duration. 14 7 But compensation for individual expenditures or sacri-
fices is inappropriate for a marital community. Moreover, addressing the
problem through the prism of alimony-even if cloaked under the name
of compensation-is misguided. Alimony is associated with need and
thus unjustifiably diminishes a spouse's entitlement to the other's in-
creased earning capacity. 148 By associating the claim to this marital asset
with dependency, this practice sends the wrong cultural message.' 49
145. Weitzman, supra note 67, at 388.
146. See, e.g., Parkman, supra note 128, at 7 ("[Flailure to incorporate the effects of
marriage on the human capital of the spouses.., in any systematic way is a major cause for
divorced women suffering a substantial reduction in their welfare."); Rhode & Minow,
supra note 28, at 200 ("An approach that ignores future earning capacity in defining
marital resources will reinforce gender disparities."); Williams, supra note 64, at 258-59
(noting the subordination of wives' careers to those of their husbands, and arguing that
exclusion of human capital from property plays a role in impoverishment of women).
147. ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 5.05, at 833-34. For states making a spouse's
increased earning capacity relevant to compensation, see, e.g., In re Marriage of Olar, 747
P.2d 676, 680-81 (Colo. 1987); DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 1981);
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (N.J. 1982); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747,
752 (Okla. 1979).
148. Cf. Davis, supra note 134, at 143-45 (arguing that alimony is associated with
dependency and subservience, while property entails autonomy, entitlement, and dignity);
Ertman, supra note 4, at 83 n.23 (noting that alimony is based on need and is therefore
"charity rather than entitlement"); Cynthia Lee Stames, Victims, .Breeders, Joy, and Math:
First Thoughts on Compensatory Spousal Payments Under the Principles, 8 Duke J.
Gender L. & Pol'y 137, 140-42 (2001) (characterizing need-based alimony as casting wives
as "beggars" and compensatory alimony as casting them as "victims" or "breeders,"
depending on whether the ALI would grant them additional alimony for child care
expenses).
149. In documenting the "traditional method of doling out money to women"
common to most marriages at the turn of the last century, Viviana Zelizer notes that "the
dole was defined as demeaning, appropriate as payment for subordinates but not for
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More importantly, it has an undesirable material effect on the law. The
ALI, for instance, makes entitlement to a portion of a spouse's future
earning capacity dependent on differences in post-divorce income, ad-
justing it in the case of events such as remarriage.15 0 But if each spouse is
entitled to the other's increased earning capacity, he or she should not
forfeit these entitlements on remarriage, or because of hard work or sim-
ple good fortune.
Perhaps the most common objection to division of earning capacity
on divorce is that it is not property. 151 We, too, have limited the category
of marital property to things that are fungible. But future earning capac-
ity is not just a personal attribute: It is an income-generating asset. 1 52
True, a spouse cannot sell her professional degree, 153 but she certainly
can sell a portion of her future earnings, even in advance. Future earn-
ing capacity is capable of treatment as property, and engaging in an es-
sentialist inquiry into the nature of property simply masks the inherent
normative choices.' 54
The more serious objections to division of earning capacity are nor-
mative and arise from autonomy. Future earning capacity is seen as an
individual accomplishment, indeed a constitutive component of the indi-
vidual self.1 55 While we agree that career plays a role in individual auton-
omy and personhood, the development of careers during marriage is also
centrally collective: Spouses move away from more desirable jobs, work
fewer hours, sacrifice potential for advancement, and even give up ca-
partners in marriage." Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money 48-53 (1994).
Likewise, by associating women's claim to a share of men's increased earning capacity with
dependency, the law forces women "to play the 'mendicant before a husband.'" Id. at 49;
see also Davis, supra note 134, at 143-45 (Addressing wives' share of husbands' increased
earning capacity through alimony rather than marital property "maintains their unequal
relationship. It keeps her dependent on him and allows him to exert power over her. It
also impacts adversely on her view of herself and the world's view of her. It denies her
personhood, her autonomy, and her free agency."). The impact of this association is
similar (though not compounded by gender inequality) where the roles are reversed (i.e.,
where the husband claims a share of his wife's increased earning capacity).
150. See ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 5.08 & cmt. a, at 864-65.
151. See id. § 4.07 cmt. a, at 697; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75,
77 (Colo. 1978) (stating that educational degrees are not property, and thus should not be
included in the marital estate); Ellman, supra note 50, at 69 (arguing that degrees and
licenses are not property).
152. Parkman, supra note 128, at 6.
153. Graham, 574 P.2d at 77.
154. Rhode & Minow, supra note 28, at 200-01; see also Charles A. Reich, The New
Property After 25 Years, 24 U.S.F. L. Rev. 223, 226-27 (1990) (noting the application of
property rights to protect parties in nontraditional contexts). Interestingly, the ALI
concedes this point. See ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 4.03 cmt. b, at 652 ("The
definition of marital property must follow from the policy choice; the policy choice is not
determined by the definition.").
155. Jana B. Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won't Fit,
31 Fam. L.Q. 119, 125-26 (1997).
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reers entirely for the good of the community. 156 Careers involve collec-
tive decisionmaking and collective action; they require a difficult accom-
modation of the wills of two individuals, and thus solidify spouses'
collective commitments. Dividing increased earning capacity is therefore
important to the marital community as well as to the individual spouse.
Fortunately, inclusion of career assets within the marital estate leaves
room for their individual aspect. Dividing the financial component of
one's career still leaves her with the features of her career most essential
to individual autonomy and personhood.1 5 7 The rule we endorse does
not, and should not, attempt to take away a spouse's sense of satisfaction
or achievement, intellectual interest, or the friendships and other en-
gagements that come from a career. This rule leaves the constitutive as-
pects of one's career as the accomplished individual's entitlement and
"collectivizes" only the resulting income.
Another autonomy objection concerns the constraint that entitle-
ment to a portion of a spouse's future earnings may pose on that spouse's
ability to make future autonomous choices. 158 Is a spouse who received a
prestigious medical degree during the pendency of marriage obliged to
practice as a physician in order to pay her former spouse half of the earn-
ing potential they together generated? 1 59 This would constitute a serious
intrusion on exit by placing a heavy and unjustified burden on future
decisions concerning one's career.' 60
156. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 50, at 61 (acknowledging the sacrifice involved in
forgoing economic opportunities for the good of one's spouse); Barbara Stark, Marriage
Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1479, 1519
(2001) ("[W]omen overwhelmingly put their children's interests and husband's careers
before their own.").
157. We do not claim that these aspects of one's career are intrinsically more essential
to personhood. Rather, as with all claims about personhood, situating a resource or
activity along the continuum from constitutive to fungible depends on social meanings.
See Hanoch Dagan, Qualitative Judgments and Social Criticism in Private Law: A
Comment on Professor Keating, 4 Theoretical Inquiries L. 89, 99-102 (2003) (arguing that
the law must necessarily act on socially contingent assumptions, but insisting that these
assumptions must be constantly reexamined to justify the value attributed to them as
opposed to alternatives).
158. It is the existence of this future autonomous choice that separates future earning
capacity from wages earned during marriage but not collected until after divorce, which
the ALI deems marital property. See ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 4.08, at 712-13.
159. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property 33-34 (1993) (arguing that
making degree-holding individuals compensate former spouses poses personhood
difficulties-"the symbolic message, backed by powerful economic incentives, is that he is
locked for life into the career he chose during marriage"); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses
and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property Rhetoric, 82 Geo. L.J. 2303, 2380 (1994)
(noting that recognizing claims on post-divorce income "appears to compromise the post-
divorce independence of the wage-earner"). One court has even gone so far as to suggest
that such an award would constitute involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment. See Severs v. Severs, 426 So. 2d 992, 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
160. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 5, at 600-01 (noting critically that heavy exit
taxes can effectively "lock[ I members into their current communities"); cf. Walzer, supra
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This objection, while valid, need not be fatal. Designating that earn-
ing capacity is only subject to division once it is realized-that is, if and
when the money is actually made-preserves each spouse's ability to
make whatever career choices he or she wishes. 161 If a spouse chooses to
benefit from decisions made and advantages gained by the marital com-
munity, both spouses should benefit. This is not just a technical compro-
mise; rather, a realization-based rule properly reflects the nature of the
entitlement-the reason to divide increased earning capacity equally is
not to reward individual investment but to share the rewards of a joint
life. 162 Even during marriage, spouses may choose not to realize their
career potential, and that is not necessarily a wrong to the community or
the other spouse. 16 3
How would earning capacity be valued as a marital asset? As both
spouses will experience some change in earning capacity through the
note 40, at 11-12, 21 (defining liberalism as entailing a strong commitment to geographic,
social, marital, and political mobility).
161. The realization-based rule, however, interferes with the law's aspiration for
spouses to have a "clean break" after divorce. See, e.g., Koelsch v. Koelsch, 713 P.2d 1234,
1241-43 (Ariz. 1986) (emphasizing the importance of a clean break in determining the
method of property distribution); Dewan v. Dewan, 506 N.E.2d 879, 881 (Mass. 1987)
(same); Haltom v. Haltom, 755 P.2d 876, 879 (Wyo. 1988) (same). Because the amount
cannot be known in advance, spouses will continue to interact, at least through a check in
the mail, and may even have to enter into negotiations or return to court to determine the
precise amount realized. This objection should not be overstated, however, because a
clean break is almost impossible (not to mention undesirable) for the many couples with
children. Davis, supra note 134, at 131. Estimates of earning capacity combined with
relatively stringent modification standards might also lessen the need for contact without
overburdening individual career choices.
162. Admittedly, the fact that a spouse must split a portion of his future income with a
former spouse decreases his incentive to remain in a career in which he has already
invested, and may thus discourage the productive use of resources. See Parkman, supra
note 104, at 164-65 (arguing that modifiable income sharing after divorce "creates
disincentives for ex-spouses to seek their best employment opportunity since they will have
to share their income with their ex-spouse").
163. This responds to the complaint that the realization rule is unfair to the other
spouse. See, e.g., Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education:
Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 U. Kan. L. Rev. 379, 416
(1980) (arguing that a "spouse who has benefited by acquiring an increased earning
capacity that can be presently valued in dollars should pay to the investor [the other
spouse] the value of the return that both expected the investor to enjoy"); Katherine Wells
Meighan, For Better or for Worse: A Corporate Finance Approach to Valuing Educational
Degrees at Divorce, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 193, 195 (1997) ("[Spouses] expect their joint
investment in the professional degree to considerably increase the student spouse's
potential earnings and thus augment the couple's future standard of living. As such,
courts should ensure that the spouses receive the benefit of their bargain by treating these
contributions as a financial investment."). Although malicious underemployment is a
possibility after divorce, it is relatively unlikely because it deprives the wage-earner of the
same benefit. When such a problem arises, there is little marital property law can do to
address it. We are reluctant to allow courts to ask the question for fear of requiring people
to stay in jobs against their will. However, in pathological cases where abuse is clear, law
should intervene.
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course of their marriage, differences in both spouses' earning capacities
at the time of marriage and the time of divorce should be aggregated. All
increases in earning capacity generated during marriage must be eligible
for division; making inclusion dependant on contribution of the other
spouse would be anathema to the equal sharing principle. Thus, in a
traditional family, one spouse would likely have an earning capacity gain,
while the other would have an earning capacity loss. When the aggregate
of these is positive, the difference should be split between the parties.
When the aggregate is negative-which may occur due to poor career
choices, as well as when spouses give up careers to care for children or
engage in other nonwage pursuits-the difference should be a debt to be
divided. In both cases, the calculation should appropriately leave endow-
ments like intelligence or creativity, which are intrinsic to the individual,
out of the marital pool.
We do not deny that such valuations will be difficult. 164 But it will
likely be no more burdensome (and the calculations will be no more un-
certain) than similar valuations that are currently done, particularly in
tort actions.1 65 As in tort law, rough-and-ready estimates based on aver-
ages can be used, 166 provided they can be adjusted in demonstrably
unique cases.
2. Preexisting Property. - The vast majority of American states, as well
as the ALI, generally do not make premarital assets subject to division on
divorce.1 6 7 Though the rule is widespread, its justification in light of the
ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community is, on its face, diffi-
164. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (NJ. 1982) (noting that
valuing a professional degree before the start of one's career "would involve a gamut of
calculations that reduces to little more than guesswork"); Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d
131, 133 (Ohio 1986) (recognizing the complexity of valuating a professional degree due
to the speculative reduction of future value to present value); Schneider, supra note 1, at
232 (describing the difficulties of using statistical data and averages to calculate earning
capacity in the alimony context); see also Singer, supra note 117, at 1116-17 (discussing
problems encountered in "[e]xpanding the definition of marital property to include less
tangible forms of career assets such as education and future earnings").
165. See Davis, supra note 134, at 118 ("On a daily basis, in courts all over the country,
judges and juries calculate the value of various losses and interests. ... ); Allen M.
Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in Divorce Settlements, 40 Ark.
L. Rev. 439, 447 n.34 (1987) ("Economists are routinely called upon to estimate the value
of future income streams of individuals in court cases dealing with wrongful death or
personal injury."); see also Washburn v. Washburn, 677 P.2d 152, 163 (Wash. 1984)
(Rosellini,J., dissenting) ("A court can easily extend the tort concept of valuation of future
earning capacity to a situation in which the supporting spouse will lose the economic
benefits of the degreed spouse's education upon dissolution of the marriage.").
166. See, e.g., National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
15(a) (3) (B) (2000) (describing the compensation scheme for vaccine-related injury using
"average gross weekly earnings of workers in the private, non-farm sector, less appropriate
taxes and the average cost of a health insurance policy").
167. See ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 4.03 cmt. a, at 650-51. The rest, "hotchpot"
states, divide them only in the case of long marriages. See id. § 4.03 Reporter's Notes cmt.
a, at 657.
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cult. On the one hand, keeping preexisting property separate seems in-
consistent with the mandate of broad sharing. On the other hand, divi-
sion of preexisting property seems inconsistent with the commitment to
autonomy reflected in no-fault divorce.
To see why the majority rule is coherent within the ideal of the egali-
tarian liberal community, it must be viewed in the context of the contem-
porary United States, where people often marry multiple times. If preex-
isting property were included in the marital community, the first
marriage would be privileged over others that may come later. The first
spouse would share not only the fruits of the marriage, but also the fruits
of the other spouse's premarital activities. To avoid the complete coloni-
zation of a spouse's life, thus penalizing subsequent marriages, law must
acknowledge the possibility, however undesirable, that the period of mar-
riage (and thus sharing) may come to an end. Therefore, spouses should
be expected to share the benefits and burdens of their life together, not
those of their lives before (or after) the existence of the marital
community.' 6
8
However, the income generated during marriage by preexisting
property must be part of the marital estate. Exempting such income
would allow spouses to hold back the fruits of some of their marital labor
from the marital community, compromising the ideal of broad shar-
ing.169 Consider the analogy to earning potential-the capacity to gener-
168. Such an approach does not pose any special problem for equality within
marriage. While there are wide disparities between the amounts of money owned by
individuals, we assume that people can protect themselves against exploitation by refusing
to enter into a potentially exploitative marriage. This is not true, however, if these
disparities are based on gender inequality. As to the allocation of "family money," disparity
based on gender inequality does not appear to be a significant problem. See John H.
Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 Mich. L.
Rev. 722, 727 n.13, 736 (1988) (suggesting that as financial capital transmission within
families decreased in importance with the advent of the modern economy and as feminist
sensibilities spread, family wealth transmission to daughters increased, particularly in the
form of investment in daughters' education). But cf. Rose, supra note 68, at 246, 261 n.46
(suggesting that gender inequality provides incentives to invest more heavily in sons than
in daughters, but citing sources showing that investment in sons' and daughters' education
in America is virtually equal). Because men tend to marry later than women, see, e.g., U.S.
Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, America's Families and Living Arrangements 9
(2001), available at http://andview.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (noting the median age at first marriage for men, 26.8, and for
women, 25.1), and command higher wages on the market, see supra note 66, any money
separately earned before marriage may be a result of gender inequity, and therefore a
source of such inequity within marriage. This, too, is one of the asymmetries we address
with rehabilitative alimony.
169. See ALl Principles, supra note 8, § 4.04 Reporter's Notes cmt. c, at 667. Contrary
to the UMPA approach, Unif. Marital Prop. Act § 14, 9A pt. I U.L.A. 141 (1998) (making
income from separate property marital property only when the labor that produced it
comes from the non-owning spouse), this should be so regardless of which spouse's labor it
is. See, e.g., ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 4.04(2), at 663; J. Thomas Oldham, Divorce,
Separation and the Distribution of Property § 6.04[2], at 6-20 to 6-21 (2003); William A.
Reppy, Jr., The Uniform Marital Property Act: Some Suggested Revisions for a Basically
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ate income based on human capital. While spouses are married, the
fruits of this capacity (wages) are divided. But upon divorce, only the
capital accumulated during marriage is marital property-preexisting
earning capacity remains a spouse's separate property. 170 This mirrors
our approach to preexisting property more generally.17 '
Furthermore, most states 17 2 and the AL1173 allow for some transmu-
tation of preexisting property into the marital community. This reflects
the reality of marriage-many spouses do in fact intend to give some of
their separate property to the community while it exists. This is due, we
think, to two phenomena: the moral imperative to share all one has with
a loved one in financial need (for instance, a spouse who refuses to pay
for the costs of a medical crisis out of separate property has failed in the
duties of love), and the fact that, over time, spouses feel less need and less
desire to guard against the possibility of divorce and remarriage.1 74
For the latter reason, we agree with the ALI and the practice in many
states that the length of the marriage is in general a good proxy for intent
Sound Act, 21 Hous. L. Rev. 679, 706 (1984); Suzanne Reynolds, Increases in Separate
Property and the Evolving Marital Partnership, 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. 239, 291-92 (1989).
170. See Thomas R. Andrews, Income from Separate Property: Towards a Theoretical
Foundation, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1993, at 171, 209-10; cf. Oldham, supra note
169, § 6.04[2], at 6-18 (arguing that preexisting assets should be treated as separate
property, as "only property stemming from the efforts of either spouse during marriage
should be divisible marital property").
171. One interesting question is whether income from separate property should be
treated differently than standard appreciation-what the property would gain with no
intervention by either spouse. There is no clear analogy with earning capacity here, as
unutilized skills rarely have market value. If appreciation is to be set aside, as it is in most
states, we think the best approach is that of the court in Pereira v. Pereira, which held that
separate property should be allowed a reasonable rate of return and any amount in excess
should be attributed to the marital community. 103 P. 488, 491 (Cal. 1909); cf. ALI
Principles, supra note 8, § 4.05, at 668-69 (subtracting "the amount by which capital of the
same value would have increased over the same time period if invested in assets of relative
safety requiring little management" from the increase in property value from the later of
(1) time of purchase of such property and (2) time of marriage). The alternative is to
compensate the other spouse for any labor performed. See Van Camp v. Van Camp, 199 P.
885, 889 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921). The Pereira approach is favorable because it treats
spouses as partial joint owners rather than as employer and employee. Cf. Reynolds, supra
note 169, at 281 ("When the courts 'compensate' the community instead of allowing it to
share in the increase in value, the courts ignore the community's right to share the fruits of
marital labor."). For an in-depth discussion of the Pereira and Van Camp rules, see J.
Thomas Oldham, Separate Property Businesses That Increase in Value During Marriage,
1990 Wis. L. Rev. 585, 593-605.
172. For a discussion of transmutation under current law, see Oldham, supra note
169, § 11.
173. See ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 4.12(1), at 769-70.
174. Preexisting debts are also likely to be treated in such a way as to signal an intent
to incorporate them into the marital community. Spouses may pay off a preexisting credit
card debt, or, more significantly, take on debt that is associated with a particular asset-a
piece of land or a professional degree-that was purchased by one spouse prior to their
marriage. In these cases, it seems artificial to transmute the debt and not the asset.
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to transmute separate property. 7 5 Of course, spouses should be allowed
to easily and unilaterally opt out of this default rule. We also support the
relatively common "gift presumption"-that if a spouse's name is added
to the title of separate property (or an item purchased in whole or in part
with separate property), that property should be transmuted. 76 Placing
property into joint names is a symbolic act of shared ownership, as it typi-
cally carries with it rights to joint management, giving each spouse the
ability to make major decisions that affect the value of the property, even
alienation. 177
We do not agree with some states that allow this presumption to be
rebutted if a spouse can show an alternative benefit (such as a tax advan-
tage) to be gained by placing tide to property in joint names.178 The
decision is still a significant collective move even if it is partly motivated
by such a reason. A joint bank account, for instance, may enable two
people to avoid checking fees by maintaining a higher average monthly
balance, but people do not share bank accounts with strangers or even
with close friends.179 Nor do we think the presumption should be rebut-
ted by a showing that a spouse only put title to property in joint names
175. See ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 4.12 cmts. a, b, Reporter's Notes cmt. a, at
771, 772, 781-82.
176. See Oldham, supra note 169, § 11.01[2], at 11-4 & n.11.
177. See Oldham, supra note 95, at 100 (observing that title determines locus of
decisionmaking authority in non-community-property states). On this logic, it is difficult
to justify some states' restriction of the gift presumption to real property, Oldham,
supra note 169, § 11.01 [2], at 11-6 n.11, or the less extreme exclusion of proceeds from
separate property deposited into joint bank accounts, see, e.g., Mink v. Mink, 558 N.Y.S.2d
329, 330 (App. Div. 1990) (excluding from marital estate proceeds from sale of separate
property deposited in joint bank account). The latter, in particular, gives rise to complex
(and absurd) attempts to "trace" each dollar in a bank account to one spouse's funds or
the other's.
178. See Oldham, supra note 169, § 11.01[2], at 11-6 to 11-8 (noting courts rejecting
the gift presumption where the owner spouse selected the joint title form for an estate
planning purpose or convenience); see also, e.g., Alwell v. Alwell, 471 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901-02
(App. Div. 1984) (finding the presumption rebutted by evidence showing that title was
placed in the husband's name for tax purposes only). But see Lynam v. Gallagher, 526
A.2d 878, 884-85 (Del. 1987) (holding that placing property in joint names for tax
purposes did not rebut presumption as it did not constitute agreement between parties
that property would not become marital property). For a discussion of these tax benefits,
see Lowell S. Thomas, Jr., Tax Consequences of Marriage, Separation, and Divorce
§§ 5.02(a), 5.03, 5.04, at 71-72, 77, 89 (3d ed. 1986).
179. This is especially true where the benefits of joint ownership are internal to the
marriage. For instance, in Peterson v. Peterson, a husband added his wife's name to the tide
to his home because she refused to move in until he had done so. 595 S.W.2d 889, 890
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980). Based on this fact, the appellate court upheld the finding at trial
that the family home was not marital property. Id. at 892-93. This conclusion is entirely
inappropriate-spousal insistence on sharing in order to make a marriage work need not
negate the meaning of the act as sharing. The creation and recreation of the marital
plural self involves adjustment of individual spouses' understanding of and expectation
from the marital community; bargaining, both implicit and explicit, is often part of this
ongoing process. See supra note 37 (discussing the phenomenology of the decision to
divorce).
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assuming the marriage would last until death. 180 A large amount of
spousal sharing is, at one level, motivated by the assumption of lifelong
marriage. That assumption sometimes proves to be false, but this does
not mean that the sharing itself never happened. Of course, all this is not
to say that the presumption should be irrebuttable-those who clearly
specify when adding a spouse's name that they do not intend to share
should be in the clear. But the act of placing title to property in joint
names is a powerful symbol of sharing that should not be undermined by
standard mixed motives or unrealistic expectations alone.
While thus far we have focused on intent, there is one circumstance
where property should be transmuted regardless of intent-when items
are used during marriage. The most common example is the family
home, but also included are furniture, automobiles, and other items used
by the family. State acceptance of "transmutation by use" is mixed, with a
healthy minority of states accepting it in at least some form. 18 1 A spouse
who has lived in a family home (and quite possibly raised children in it)
perceives the property as an aspect of personhood-in constitutive rather
than merely instrumental terms.)8 2 Furthermore, it is not only important
to individual identity, but also to identity as a member of the marital com-
munity. 113 For the spouse who owns this property separately to claim
180. See Oldham, supra note 169, § 11.01[2], at 11-4 & n.10 ("If it is determined that
a spouse does not intend ajoint title designation to constitute a completed unconditional
gift to the other spouse, the gift could be perceived as one subject to a condition
subsequent-that the marriage would endure until the death of one of the spouses.").
181. See id. § 11.02[2], at 11-18 to 11-19. The doctrine has been justified as "implied
agreement," see id., and though we agree that use often indicates intent, we think there is
a more fundamental justification.
182. See, e.g., MargaretJane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957,
959-61 (1982) (arguing that some "objects are closely bound up with personhood because
they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the
world" and providing examples of "a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a house").
The "attachment" to which we refer is not sentimental; rather, it is constitutive of a
person's identity. See Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property 343-89 (1988)
(discussing the Hegelian argument that private property is needed to "sustain and develop
the abilities and self-conceptions definitive of [one's] status as [a] person[ ]"); Meir Dan-
Cohen, The Value of Ownership, 9J. Pol. Phil. 404, 434 (2001) (arguing that ownership
contributes to the definition of the boundaries of the self).
183. For examples of communities claiming personhood value in property, see, e.g.,
Andrew Gray, Indigenous Rights and Development: Self-Determination in an Amazonian
Community 117-22 (1997) ("The territory belongs to the spirits of those ancestors who are
dead and those Arakmbut who are living, and provides the potential life for those who are
yet to come."), Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual
Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 175, 194 (2000)
(arguing that artistic works in tribal societies are collective projects "through which all
tribal members, living, dead and unborn, speak their voice and become a part of the tribal
way"), and Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 Ethics 4, 19-20 (1992)
(noting the priority of property claims by groups such as aboriginal tribes "where the
dispossessed subject is a tribe or community, rather than an individual, and where the
holding of which it has been dispossessed is particularly important for its sense of identity
as a community").
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such property as her own and to treat it as such during marriage13 4 would
undermine marital sharing, trust, and commitment.18 5 However, be-
cause both spouses are likely to have a personhood interest in the prop-
erty, but both cannot leave with physical possession, applying the equal
division principle in this instance is problematic. We therefore recom-
mend giving the original owner a right of first purchase, reflective of her
likely greater personhood interest.
3. Gifts and Inheritances. - Like preexisting assets, almost all states
designate property acquired by one spouse by gift186 or inheritance 18 7
during the marriage as separate. To be separate, the donor must intend
the property for only one of the spouses-gifts and inheritances to both
spouses are marital property as a matter of course.18 8 While donor intent
currently determines the designation of such assets as marital or separate
property, it should not be dispositive. After all, most employers intend to
pay wages to only one spouse, but this is irrelevant to the classification of
wages earned during marriage as marital property. 189
The most common justification given for treating gifts and inheri-
tances differently is that neither requires spousal labor. 190 Title to such
property is "lucrative" rather than "onerous."' 9 1 But labor should not be
the standard for inclusion in the marital estate-even the fruits of good
luck, if they accrue to one spouse while married, ought to be marital
property. Moreover, gifts do involve labor. Gift exchange can be seen as
a form of market exchange involving "noncommodities such as status,
obligation, 'psychic reward' or the like."192 In many contexts, gift ex-
change is implicitly reciprocal-gifts are given as payback for favors
granted or in anticipation of favorable future treatment.' 93 Inheritances,
184. Imagine the separate property-owning spouse forbidding the other from altering
the family home in any way because doing so might compromise its value, or urging her to
be particularly careful when driving his separately owned car.
185. This rule may seem to have the undesirable effect of punishing the spouse who
shares property, while rewarding the hoarder, thus arguably incentivizing hoarding. SeeJ.
Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 Fam. L.Q. 219, 246-47
(1989). But spouses have reasons to share that are separate from the likelihood of
recovery-sharing separate property makes marriages work better and signals
commitment. As we argue throughout, marriage law need not, and should not, ensure
that all decisions made to further the community are also protected against individual loss.
186. Oldham, supra note 169, § 6.02, at 6-3 & n.I.
187. Id. § 6.03, at 6-14.2 & n.1.
188. See, e.g., Calloway v. Calloway, 832 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
gifts to both spouses marital property).
189. See supra Part II.B.
190. See Oldham, supra note 169, §§ 6.02[1], 6.03[1], at 6-3, 6-14.2.
191. See id. § 6.02[1], at 6-3.
192. Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 Ind. L.J. 155, 157 (1989). For a
classic anthropological treatment of gift exchange, see Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form
and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies (W.D. Halls trans., 1990) (1950), examining
gift-giving in primitive societies and focusing on gifts as a form of economic exchange.
193. SeeJeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gifts, 46 UCLA
L. Rev. 815, 841-42 (1999) (describing Mauss's argument that "[e]very gift obligates the
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too, may be shaped by labor-related factors, such as one child's willing-
ness to care for her parents in their old age. We are not so cynical as to
suggest that all gifts are motivated wholly by a desire for something in
return-quite the contrary. 194 Still, given that labor plays a role, and that
the lucrative/onerous distinction should not determine the scope of mar-
ital property, the complete exclusion of gifts and inheritances is
unjustified.
Gifts and inheritances reflect marital good fortune or labor per-
formed during marriage, but they do so only partially. Both the luck and
the labor may precede the marriage. This is particularly true of gifts or
inheritances from family members who have had lifelong relationships
with the donee far exceeding the length of the marriage. Determining
the precise extent to which a gift reflects a relationship cultivated during
marriage is extremely complex. We thus recommend a bright-line rule
for division of gifts, based on the relative lengths of the marriage and the
relationship between donor and donee.1 9 5
It might be argued that this treatment ignores another feature of
gifts and inheritances-personhood value to the donee. Gifts and inheri-
tances are relational, reflecting (and constituting) the relationship be-
tween donor and donee not only to the parties involved, but also to the
world.' 9 6 Why should a wife receive half of a hunting rifle passed from
father to son, or a husband half of an engraved locket given to his wife by
her best friend? Even the plural self of marriage does not require that all
personal relationships be collectivized. Preserving spouses' separate iden-
tities is good both for their autonomy as individuals and the marital com-
donee to give a return gift of equal or greater value" and arguing that neither gift-giving
nor gift-receiving is voluntary-both are products of obligation and economic self-
interest). States that rigidly define marital and separate property tend to account for the
economic nature of gift-exchange by excluding from separate property gifts in
consideration for past or future services or inheritances given in consideration of care
granted before death. See Oldham, supra note 169, §§ 6.02[1], 6.03[2], at 6-3 to 6-4, 6-15.
194. See Anderson, supra note 21, at 151-52 (arguing that gift exchange "aims to
realize a shared good in the relationship itself," and therefore "is responsive to the
personal characteristics" of the recipient and to "particular qualities of the relationship").
195. The ratio-length of marriage to length of donor/donee relationship-
determines the portion of the gift or inheritance that is marital property. In the case of a
gift from a parent to a child who is fifty-two years old, and who has been married eight
years, for instance, 8/52 (or 2/13) of the gift's value should be marital property.
196. See Anderson, supra note 21, at 151 ("The goods exchanged and jointly realized
in friendship are not merely used but cherished and appreciated, for they are expressions
of shared understandings, affections, and commitments .... Gift exchange affirms and
perpetuates the ties that bind the donor and the recipient."). But see Menachem Mautner,
A justice Perspective of Contract Law: How Contract Law Allocates Entitlements, 10 Tel
Aviv U. Stud. L. 239, 251-57 (1990) (describing donees as "passive" and "non-sacrificing"
and therefore less invested in gifts than in bargained-for exchanges).
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munity-communal acts only have meaning if each spouse maintains a
separate identity. 197
This dilemma arises in the context of earning capacity and has a sim-
ilar solution in this context. Including the financial manifestations of
earning capacity as marital assets does not jeopardize one's personhood
interest in a career because the personal attributes remain separate prop-
erty. The same can be said for gifts and inheritances: Dividing their fi-
nancial value does not deprive either spouse of the attachments they re-
flect. To the extent that gifts or inheritances have personhood
(constitutive) value to the receiving spouse (for instance, a family heir-
loom), that spouse should be entitled to a right of first purchase as part
of the marriage settlement.1 98 A difficult case arises where the value of
the personhood property is greater than half of the marital estate (for
instance, where the gift is of ancestral lands), so that the interested
spouse cannot purchase the good with her fifty-percent share. Must a
spouse forfeit her constitutive property unless she can gather enough ex-
tra funds to buy the other spouse out of his portion? Here, we think
personhood interest should trump the other spouse's claim, and the
spouse with the constitutive interest should be allowed to retain the prop-
erty even if it constitutes more than her share.
C. Alimony
Alimony awards have fallen out of favor with courts in recent
years.' 99 Those few awards of alimony are almost entirely time-limited.
In particular, there has been a recent trend toward "rehabilitative ali-
mony"-alimony awards crafted to enable former spouses who assumed a
non-market role during marriage to receive education or job training to
start a new career.
20 0
The disfavored status of long-term alimony has followed the move to
no-fault divorce 20 1 and corresponds to the law's decision to allow free exit
from the marital community. The ability to exit must not be purely for-
197. Cf. Schroeder, supra note 193, at 896 ("In order for me to recognize you as a
unique human being to whom I can interrelate, I must first recognize you as a unique
person separate and alienated from me.").
198. While determining the relative personhood value of particular items will no
doubt be difficult, judges are faced with similar obstacles in many spheres and overcome
these challenges by interpreting social meanings. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Nature of the Common Law 18 (1988) (advancing this argument in discussing judicial
determination of social moral norms).
199. See Joan Williams, Unbending Gender 122 (1999) (citing a study estimating
alimony awards in eight percent of court orders concerning divorce arrangements). A
relatively large portion of these are never paid. See Mary Ann Glendon, The
Transformation of Family Law 231 (1989) (noting that only twenty-seven percent of
spouses awarded alimony as of 1985 received payment).
200. See Joan Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited
Duration Alimony, 21 Fam. L.Q. 573, 573-77 (1988); Singer, supra note 128, at 2425.
201. See Glendon, supra note 199, at 197.
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mal, but must be reflected in marital property law. Not only the mar-
riage, but also the property implications that flow therefrom, must come
to an end on divorce. 20 2 Thus, for the same reasons we support no-fault
divorce, we generally endorse the end of alimony.
We also reject the conventional justification for alimony as compen-
satory: that the losses associated with the end of marriage should be allo-
cated equally among the parties. On this theory, some feminist scholars
argue for income sharing-equalizing spouses' post-divorce living stan-
dards. 20 3 Similarly, the ALI attempts to protect spouses from the loss of
the marital standard of living upon the end of long marriages, 20 4 where
the marriage ends before an individual spouse's contributions have been
recouped, 20 5 or in certain situations where the disparity in living stan-
dards post-divorce is "unfairly disproportionate."2 06
But the question whether a particular post-divorce allocation is fair
or just requires a determination of each individual spouse's entitle-
ment.20 7 Compensation theories thus pose a baseline problem. 20 8 Some
income sharing proposals, as well as the ALI's recommended rule for
compensation in marriages of significant duration, assume as a baseline
the standard of living enjoyed during marriage,20 9 presupposing a right
to live financially as though one continued to be married. 210 This contra-
dicts the principle of free exit reflected by no-fault divorce-spouses
should be able to choose to make their joint lives come to an end. 211
202. See Sugarman, supra note 87, at 152.
203. Many of these scholars support time-limited remedial alimony. See, e.g., Okin,
supra note 63, at 183 (suggesting that living standards should be equalized for at least as
long as gendered division of labor continued); Singer, supra note 117, at 1117 (advocating
equal income sharing for a period of time half the length of the marriage). A few have put
forth proposals for permanent income sharing. See Sugarman, supra note 87, at 160
(arguing for a permanent limited interest in joint income); Jane Rutherford, Duty in
Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 539, 577-81 (1990)
(recommending permanent sharing based on spouses' expectation to share income over a
lifetime, but limiting her proposal to situations involving homemakers).
204. ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 5.03(2) (a), at 798.
205. Id. § 5.03(3) (a), at 798.
206. Id. § 5.03(3)(b), at 798.
207. Cf. Dagan, supra note 2, at 18-26 (criticizing for similar reasons the frequent
reference to "the principle of preventing unjust enrichment" as an independent
justification of legal rules or outcomes).
208. ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 5.02 cmt. a, at 788.
209. The ALI's proposal allocates the loss in standard of living equally between the
parties, making these proposals numerically identical. See id. § 5.03(2) (a), at 798.
210. Cf. J. Thomas Oldham, The Economic Consequences of Divorce in the United
States, in Frontiers of Family Law 139, 146-47 (Andrew Bainham & David Pearl eds., 1993)
(arguing that equality of result is based on the "questionable assumption that marriage is a
lifelong commitment"); Carbone, supra note 75, at 374 ("Central to the [income sharing]
proposal is recognition of a community of economic interest that continues beyond the
divorce.").
211. True, parties expect and solemnly promise to spend the rest of their lives
together. To the extent that the promise has been acted upon, this should be reflected in
the division of existing marital goods. But law is not generally in the business of protecting
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Other ALI proposals suggest a different baseline-the situation had the
marriage never occurred. This theory underlies the return of money
paid for education or training if the fruits of that investment have not yet
materialized, and compensation for expenditures made and opportuni-
ties lost for the common good. 2 12 Returning spouses to their premarital
financial situation and thereby "erasing" the decisions they made during
marriage is problematic, however, because it ignores community.
Spouses ought to share in the liabilities and the benefits of joint life.
Concomitantly, a doctrine committed to the communal ideal of marriage
should not allow reimbursement for a spousal investment as if the rela-
tionship were an arm's length transaction between strangers rather than
a joint marital project.
Despite all this, however, we ultimately recommend an alimony
scheme insofar as it is tailored to address the problem societal gender
discrimination poses for marriage. As previously discussed, serious dis-
parities exist between the post-divorce financial status of men and wo-
men. These disparities give men greater bargaining power within mar-
riage, raising the specter of subordination. Rehabilitative alimony can
help ameliorate this difficulty.
If men and women entered marriage with equal abilities to earn in-
come in the market, and left marriage the same way, the rule of equal
property division, combined with the clean break approach to alimony,
would be perfectly consistent with the vision of equality within marriage.
Even in our imperfect world, the equal division rule supports equality by
sending a message of equal entitlement and partially equalizing men's
greater market power with respect to the resources of the marital commu-
nity. But this is not enough. The problem is that this rule does not
equalize men's relative power with respect to matters outside the marital
community. Formal equal division of marital property does little to re-
solve the deeper substantive inequality between men and women. 2 13 Af-
ter divorce, women are still left disadvantaged by other phenomena, such
as workplace wage discrimination. 2 14
Because this Article brackets policies external to the marital commu-
nity, we express no view on the use of divorce law to address gender im-
balances in society more generally. But we cannot ignore the problem of
gender subordination entirely. Because gender inequality is not just a
against the emotional injury of broken promises or disappointed expectations, and
certainly should not do so by forcing such a pervasive engagement. We do not take a
position on the moral desirability of lifelong marriage. To the extent that the issue is a
moral one, social norms are a more appropriate mechanism for enforcement-spouses
may ultimately resist the pressure of society, but not the force of the law.
212. See ALI Principles, supra note 8, §§ 5.12 & cmt. a, 5.13, at 889-90, 896-97.
213. Fineman, supra note 106, at 827-30.
214. See, e.g., Shannon Henry, Male-Female Salary Gap Growing, Study Says, Wash.
Post, Jan. 24, 2002, at A2 (discussing results of a GAO study showing that female managers
make less money than men in many key industries and highlighting the deepening of the
gender salary gap during 1995 to 2000).
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problem for women individually, but a problem for marriage itself, mari-
tal property law must take notice. Insofar as alimony can equalize
spouses' financial positions upon divorce, it has the potential to amelio-
rate the serious problems gender inequality causes in the marital relation-
ship.2 15 These problems should not be addressed through income equal-
ization because such a solution imposes a massive burden on spouses'
ability to exit the relationship and start new lives. Requiring former hus-
bands to equalize their wives' financial situations for the remainder of
their lives makes exit from marriage too costly. Imposing a prohibitive
exit tax on men wishing to leave the marital community undermines not
only spouses' autonomy, but also the community itself, constituted as it is
of voluntary attachments. Securing gender equality within marriage while
not compromising exit or community is thus one of the most difficult
challenges facing marital property law. The most the law can hope for,
we think, is a reasonable compromise. 2 16
A practice similar, but not identical, to rehabilitative alimony can
help address this challenge. Rehabilitative alimony awards support lesser-
earning spouses' receipt of education or training that will enable them to
better support themselves after divorce. 2 17 Such awards are inherently
time-limited, thus limiting the impact they have on exit. Unlike some
time-limited income sharing suggestions, moreover, rehabilitative ali-
mony has the advantage of being expressly aimed toward self-suffi-
ciency.21 8 Because rehabilitative alimony is based not on continuing the
financial obligations of marriage beyond divorce, but rather on the im-
portance of giving women the tools to overcome their market disadvan-
tages, the measure of recovery for rehabilitative alimony should be calcu-
lated with this specific goal in mind.21 9 Moreover, rehabilitative alimony
215. See ALI Principles, supra note 8, § 5.05 cmt. c, at 809-11.
216. This is one instance where balancing (rather than accommodating) the values
underlying the egalitarian liberal community is necessary. See supra notes 16-17 and
accompanying text (positing the ability to accommodate particular conceptions of
equality, autonomy, and community without resort to balancing).
217. SeeJohn C. Williams, Annotation, Propriety in Divorce Proceedings of Awarding
Rehabilitative Alimony, 97 A.L.R.3d 740, 743-44 (1980).
218. We do not endorse any alimony scheme that overly constrains women's choices,
such as the requirement that spouses seeking rehabilitative alimony follow a specific
rehabilitative plan. See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Hanrahan, 618 So. 2d 779, 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (overruling the trial court's rehabilitative alimony award because "the evidence
and the findings in the appealed judgment [we]re legally insufficient to support a specific
plan of rehabilitation").
219. Consistent with this view, rehabilitative alimony is not necessarily cut off by
remarriage. Frye v. Frye, 385 So. 2d 1383, 1390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Also, in certain
cases, the form that rehabilitative alimony should take is a full or partial exemption for
wives from sharing with their husbands the value of the increased earning capacity the
wives gained during the tenure of marriage. Consider, for example, the case of a wife
whose human capital was significantly enhanced during marriage but-given the even
more significant disparity in the spouses' situation at the beginning of their marriage-is
still less well-off upon divorce. The wife in such a case has, in a sense, already realized her
right to rehabilitative alimony prior to divorce. In other words, had she left the marriage
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is neither about compensation nor about contribution-with very few ex-
ceptions, courts approving rehabilitative alimony awards do not consider
spouses' premarital standards of living or the contributions that a spouse
made to the other's earning potential.22 0
Such a system admittedly places some of the burdens of societal gen-
der discrimination on the alimony-paying spouse. We do not think this is
unfair, however, because he too benefits from the arrangement. To the
extent that he desires the unique goods arising from communal mar-
riage, he benefits from lessening the threat to genuine community posed
by gender inequality. A limited alimony obligation enables him to par-
ticipate in and benefit from a good marriage without unduly compromis-
ing his autonomy. He also benefits from other features of gender dis-
crimination-greater wages due to the salary gap and the gendered
division of labor that allows him to more cheaply obtain household ser-
vices 22 1-and divesting him of some of these ill-gotten gains is not unfair.
The exercise of discretion necessary in determining the precise
amount of alimony requires courts to make concrete the compromise we
endorse. How much rehabilitative alimony a former spouse receives, and
for how long, depends on the balance between the need to facilitate
wives' new beginning and the need to minimize the burden on husbands.
Courts do not presently think of the issue in these terms. 222 Although
the amount is not readily susceptible to a bright-line rule, courts will bet-
ter exercise their discretion if they directly consider these motivating
concerns.
Finally, rehabilitative alimony should be limited to distributions from
men to women. While men may sometimes have fewer resources and
opportunities than their spouses, they are not compelled to enter into
such a marriage by the external forces of gender discrimination. As a
realistic matter, however, existing Supreme Court precedent would not
without this increased earning capacity, we would have supported an award of
rehabilitative alimony. Insofar as the increased earning capacity she gained during the
tenure of marriage satisfies the aims of such rehabilitative alimony, there is no reason to
punish her for acquiring it before a divorce. Conceptually, granting her a total or partial
exemption (according to the circumstances of the case) from a rule that incorporates any
increased earning capacity into the marital estate is tantamount to rehabilitative alimony.
220. See 24A Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation § 857 (1998) [hereinafter Divorce
and Separation] (listing factors considered by courts).
221. Marion Crain and Ken Matheny observe:
Th[e] gendered division of labor more than merely dominates or oppresses
women solely for gender power; it exploits women. Men appropriate the value of
women's unpaid services in the home, while they also profit from the higher
wages paid in occupations from which women are excluded by virtue of their
unpaid care-taking duties.
Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, "Labor's Divided Ranks": Privilege and the United Front
Ideology, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1542, 1592 (1999).
222. See Divorce and Separation, supra note 220, § 857.
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allow a state to limit alimony to women. 22 3 Practically, then, states would
have to make this sort of alimony available to men as well as women, a
practice that goes beyond its justification. 224
D. Property Governance During Marriage
There are two major regimes of marital property governance in the
United States-community property and equitable division. 225 A third
regime based on title theory-where goods are allocated to individual
spouses based on nonmarital ownership rules-is no longer part of the
law.22 6 The majority of states are common law equitable division
states. 22 7 In equitable division states, title theory still governs property
questions during an intact marriage, while equitable principles govern
the allocation of entitlements upon divorce. 228 Nine states are commu-
nity property states, providing for joint ownership during marriage. 229
While currently the differences between these regimes are not significant
for property division, 230 there are significant differences between these
regimes in terms of property governance. In equitable division states, ti-
tle determines ownership and therefore determines powers of manage-
ment and alienation during marriage. 231 By contrast, the basic principle
of community property is that "[t]he respective interests of the husband
and wife . . . during continuance of the marriage relation are present,
223. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (invalidating a statute imposing alimony
obligations exclusively on men).
224. It also provides further reason to question the constitutional commitment to
formal equality. For a critique of this focus, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution is Color Blind," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1991), arguing that a commitment to
constitutional "color-blindness" fosters subordination of racial minorities.
225. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 382 (5th ed. 2002).
226. See ALl Principles, supra note 8, at 21-22; see also Turner, supra note 111,
§ 2.03, at 33 (conceding that "title theory does a poor job of implementing modern
notions of both individualism and sharing").
227. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 225, at 382.
228. This is also one approach taken by the Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act. See
Unif. Marriage and Divorce Act § 307 Alternative A, 9A pt. I U.L.A. 288 (1998).
229. The states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See David Westfall, Family Law 231 (1994); see also
Unif. Marital Prop. Act, Prefatory Note, 9A pt. I U.L.A. 106 (1998) (identifying "present,
vested'joint ownership of marital property as central to the Act). For the historical origins
of these systems, see Mary Moers Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past,
Present and Future, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 807, 810-31. In 1998, Alaska-a common law
jurisdiction-enacted a statute that enables spouses to proactively elect to hold their
property as a community. See Alaska Stat. § 34.77.030 (Michie 2002).
230. Oldham, supra note 95, at 99.
231. See id. at 100; Turner, supra note 111, §§ 2.07-2.08, at 40-44 (noting that
marital property rights never vest in equitable distribution regimes, except when spouses
divorce). To some extent, tenancy by the entirety can provide a substitute for community
property. See Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1517, 1541-43 (2003)
(noting that tenancy by the entirety approximates the attributes of community property).
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existing, and equal interests. '232 Spouses are thus equal owners of all prop-
erty acquired during marriage, regardless of how the property is nomi-
nally titled. 233
On our theory, the choice between these two approaches is easy. A
regime that grants each spouse an immediate half interest in the marital
estate recognizes the special relationship between the spouses and rein-
forces each spouse's sense of equal participation in the marriage. By con-
trast, a system of separate property treats spouses as proprietors in their
relationships with one another, and furthermore, places the non-proper-
tied spouse in a dependent subordinate position. 234 To be sure, the his-
tory of community property is less happy than this ideal. Until very re-
cently, the husband was treated as "head and master" of the community
and given exclusive power to administer the estate. 235 The Supreme
Court struck down this flagrantly unjust practice in 1981.236 In equitable
division states, by contrast, a version of this rule remains: Spouses-in
particular, wives-have no management rights over property titled in the
other spouse's name, even if this property will eventually become part of
the marital estate for the purposes of division. 23 7 This difference illus-
trates the significance of conceptualizing ownership of marital property
as vesting immediately in both spouses.
As a long-term liberal commons, our ideal management regime for
marital property governance must include mechanisms for dynamically
232. Cal. Fain. Code § 751 (West 1994); see also, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-214(B)
(West 2000) ("The spouses have equal management, control and disposition rights over
their community property and have equal power to bind the community."); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 2336 (West 1985) ("Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the
community property."); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 123.225 (Michie 1998) (mirroring Cal. Fain.
Code § 751); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.102(c) (Vernon 1998) ("Except as provided by
Subsection (a), community property is subject to the joint management, control, and
disposition of the spouses unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of attorney in
writing or other agreement.").
233. Oldham, supra note 95, at 100; Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights
in Transition, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 21, 24 (1994).
234. Waggoner, supra note 233, at 24-25, 27. In contrast, scholars have noted that
the community property regime promotes community, autonomy, and equality. See, e.g.,
Grace Ganz Blumberg, Community Property in California 7 (3d ed. 1999) (emphasizing
the symbolic force of this regime in dignifying the contributions of both spouses);
Garrison, supra note 73, at 265-67 (noting that a joint and equal management regime "is
democratic and egalitarian; it strikes a reasonable balance between the goals of autonomy
and community"); cf. Ray August, The Spread of Community-Property Law to the Far West,
3 W. Legal Hist. 35, 35 (1990) (attributing development of community-property systems in
western states to the separate forces of migration of Spanish and French custom and
women's rights movements among western pioneers aiming "to lure industrious and
independent women from the East").
235. See, e.g., Judith Areen, Family Law 329 (4th ed. 1999); Ira Mark Ellman et al.,
Family Law 142 (3d ed. 1998) (describing the original American community property
system where the "husband was given sole management authority over all community
property").
236. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981).
237. See Ellman et al., supra note 235, at 141.
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adjusting the management of marital resources to respond to changing
circumstances. 2 38 These liberal commons mechanisms are divided into
two spheres of decisionmaking: a sphere of collective self-governance
and a sphere (or rather, spheres) of individual dominion. 239
Some decisionmaking power-particularly when decisions have
grave consequences, economic or otherwise-should be joint in order to
ensure that decisions indeed reflect the interests of the community.
Moreover, requiring joint decisionmaking reinforces the development of
the plural self.240 Joinder rules do not threaten the general reluctance to
require excessive judicial intervention within functioning marriages, 24 1
because in most cases they do not require judicial enforcement. Rather,
where joint management is required, banks and other third parties are
likely to insist on joinder before they enter into the transaction. 24 2
But not all decisions regarding marital property can, or should, be
made jointly. First, there should be room for individual decisionmaking
about management and consumption, where each party can act on her
own. 243 Such a sphere of individual dominion is needed for the practical
reason that joint decisionmaking tends to be cumbersome. 244 It also has
intrinsic value, as it both preserves the ability of each spouse to act in the
238. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 5, at 593-94.
239. Cf. id. at 582-96 (discussing the importance of mechanisms for dynamic
adjustment in liberal commons settings).
240. See id. at 591 (arguing that joint management cultivates cooperation, as well as
interpersonal relationships and interpersonal capital); Elizabeth De Armond, It Takes
Two: Remodeling the Management and Control Provisions of Community Property Law,
30 Gonz. L. Rev. 235, 249-51, 259-60, 287 (1994/1995) (opining that community
management fosters "balanced growth of the marriage and its personality as well as the
character of the marriage's participants"). Unlike other liberal commons, the marital
community, comprised of only two people, obviously cannot use a majority rule.
Unanimity, however, poses a familiar anticommons problem. See Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 622, 624 (1998) (arguing that when too many individuals have rights of exclusion,
resources are "prone to underuse-a tragedy of the anticommons"). One possible solution is
to follow the rule in California and Louisiana, where if a proposed transaction is in the best
interests of the family, and consent has been arbitrarily refused (or cannot be obtained
due to the other spouse's incapacity or absence), judicial approval of the transaction can
substitute for spousal consent. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1101(e) (West 1994); La. Civ. Code
Ann. art. 2355 (West 1985); see also N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-16 (Michie 1999) (addressing
only the issue of the other spouse's absence).
241. For the leading case on the importance of marital privacy, see McGuire v.
McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953).
242. See Dagan, supra note 231, at 1549-51 (noting that contractual creditors can
protect themselves by requiring joinder).
243. But see De Armond, supra note 240, at 256, 262-63, 268-69, 278-80, 288
(arguing that equal management legal systems increase the power of the spouse with
greatest access to marital property, and proposing a regime in which individual
decisionmaking is confined to cases where there is notice and consent).
244. See Oldham, supra note 95, at 106-07, 109 (emphasizing the logistical problems
involved in joint management, as well as the increased burden it may place upon
commerce).
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world as an individual and furthers trust by providing for spouses to
demonstrate their genuine concern for one another.
In some other contexts, mostly regarding businesses, there may be a
need for a third category. Spouse specialization and the benefit to
outside transacting parties arising from dealing with a single deci-
sionmaker may justify a realm of exclusive management authority. 245
Likewise, spouses should be able to agree to carve out certain resources
from the marital estate in order to create realms of separate activity.24 6
This tripartite structure-joint, equal, and sole management-re-
flects the emerging law in community property states. 2 4 7 By and large, we
espouse the view of this emerging consensus regarding the jurisdictional
boundaries between these governance spheres. First, we endorse the rule
that joint management should apply to "a set of transactions that gener-
ally involve substantial amounts of money (such as sales of community
real estate or a community property business) or important items (such
as household furnishings or clothing)" 2 48 because of the significance of
these decisions. This will not pose a substantial impediment in most cases
in which this rule is applied-real estate transactions and business sales-
because they already involve complicated and lengthy procedures.2 49
Moreover, the personhood value to the community and to individual
spouses of some of this property-in particular the marital residence and
its contents-bolsters the requirement of joint consent.2 50
245. See Ellman et al., supra note 235, at 146-47; Oldham, supra note 95, at 112-13,
124; see also Carol S. Bruch, Management Powers and Duties Under California's
Community Property Laws: Recommendations for Reform, 34 Hastings L.J. 229, 273-74
(1982) ("In a number of situations, sound management requires sole rather than joint
management and control.").
246. See Dagan, supra note 231, at 1540-41, 1555 (discussing the need to allow
spouses "to shape respective spheres of separate and communal activities").
247. See Oldham, supra note 95, at 106-07.
248. Id. at 109.
249. See id. at 107-09.
250. The rule we recommend is somewhat expansive vis-A-vis the rules of most
community property states. As in most states, it applies to the sale or encumbrance of all
marital realty, where both the economic significance rationale and the personhood
justification typically apply. See, e.g., Cal. Fain. Code § 1102 (West 1994) (requiring both
spouses to join in sale of marital realty); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2347 (West 1985) (same);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 123.230(3) (Michie 1998) (same). Butjoint management should also
govern in cases where only one of these rationales applies, and it is here that our preferred
rule diverges from the majority position. Where only the economic rationale is strong-
where spouses purchase marital realty or sell a marital business-only a minority of
community property states require joinder. See, respectively, Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 26.16.030 (West 1997) (prohibiting purchase of real property as well as purchase or sale
of "good will of a business where both spouses participate in its management" by one
spouse alone); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2347 (requiring concurrence for disposing of "all or
substantially all of the assets of a community enterprise"). Likewise, when only
personhood value is strong-for instance, when the contents of the marital home are sold
or encumbered-joinder is the minority rule. See, e.g., Cal. Fain. Code § 1100(c)
(prohibiting one spouse from disposing of certain types of "community personal property"
such as clothing and furniture without written consent of the other spouse); La. Civ. Code
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Sole management is tricky because it often entails an inequitable al-
location of power that can subordinate the non-managing spouse. 25' Ac-
cordingly, absent spousal agreement to the contrary, the scope of sole
management should be strictly limited to cases where the commercial ne-
cessity rationale applies. Jurisdictions that do not take care to certify this
condition-by, for example, classifying businesses as sole management
property based on title or on a factual determination that only one
spouse is indeed managing the business252-risk reintroducing a version
of title theory, with undesirable effects both on the community and, typi-
cally, on women's place within it.25 3
Ann. art. 2347 (requiring concurrence for disposition of furniture in family's home). We
also endorse a rule that bars a spouse from conveying or encumbering her interest in
marital property subject to joint management without the other's consent. Such a
unilateral transaction may detrimentally affect the other spouse, either by substantially
reducing the value of his equity, or by subjecting him to joint ownership of a personal
resource with a stranger. By contrast, we do not support the expansive (minority) view
regarding gifts, according to which all gifts of marital property are to be made jointly,
irrespective of their value. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 1100(b) (prohibiting one spouse
from making gift of community personal property without written consent of other
spouse). Joinder is unnecessary respecting gifts comprising an insignificant portion of the
marital estate. See Oldham, supra note 95, at 110, 141-42 (arguing thatjoint management
should only extend to transactions involving a "significant community concern").
Moreover, forbidding a spouse to give any gift out of marital property without the other's
consent may prevent spouses from acting as individuals, and may signal deep interspousal
distrust. For both reasons, we prefer the majority view-"only a gift of more than a
'reasonable' amount of the community requires mutual consent." Id. at 138; see also id. at
138-46 (noting exceptions in cases of unilateral gifts to children from previous marriages,
paramours, and relatives).
251. See Oldham, supra note 95, at 106 n.32, 107, 113; see also De Armond, supra
note 240, at 269-70 (discussing the "troubling" nature of state laws permitting one spouse
to exercise exclusive control over businesses owned "50-50" by both spouses).
252. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2350-2352 (allowing one spouse alone to
dispose of community property in a business, property registered in his or her own name,
or property he or she holds as a partner); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 123.230(6) (allowing one
spouse alone to acquire or dispose of assets of a business where only he/she participates in
its management); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-14(B) (Michie 1999) (allowing the title-holding
spouse to dispose of community personal property, or either spouse to acquire or dispose
of community property described in an agreement with a third party when the agreement
is with that spouse); Unif. Marital Prop. Act § 5(a), 9A pt. I U.L.A. 124 (1998) (allowing
one spouse "acting alone" to "manage and control" certain types of property).
253. This backdoor revival of title theory is also accomplished elsewhere, such as in
transactional and banking law. See Carol S. Bruch, Protecting the Rights of Spouses in
Intact Marriages, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 731, 733 ("[S] tatutes directing banks to deal only with
the named account holder effectively precluded nonwage earners from access to the
community property funds placed in such accounts by their spouses."); Richard W.
Effland, Arizona Community Property Law: Time for Review and Revision, 1982 Ariz. St.
L.J. 1, 15 (discussing property in stock where only one partner is listed on the certificates,
in unincorporated businesses, and in partnerships between one spouse and a third party,
as cases where one spouse will typically have de facto control, despite the true communal
nature of the property involved); Oldham, supra note 95, at 125-26 (noting limitations
arising from corporate and partnership law on joint management of corporations and
partnerships in community property states).
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To be sure, the external interests of purchasers for value who rely on
an asset's title with neither knowledge nor reason to suspect that the asset
is part of a marital estate may justify some protection.2 54 But this sensible
limitation on joint management does not extend to cases in which such a
third party has not yet departed with any significant value or has acted
notwithstanding his knowledge of the conflicting claim of the formal
owner's spouse. It is in any case irrelevant insofar as the bilateral relation-
ship between the spouses is concerned. By the same token, while rules
that protect commercial transactors who rely in good faith on the man-
agement authority of the managing spouse may be justified from an ex-
ternal perspective, 255 this again is far short of a full-blown entitlement to
sole management.
In any event, as long as these third-party concerns are properly ad-
dressed, a spouse should be able to shift any given marital resource to the
joint management sphere. Marital property law should approve of a re-
quest to join in by a spouse who thus far has been passive regarding the
management of a marital business, because such participation both en-
larges the realm of interspousal interaction and contracts the realm of
interspousal inequality and exclusion with its attendant detrimental con-
sequences. 256 A few state legislatures have started developing ways to
achieve this goal without jeopardizing the legitimate interests of third
254. See generally Menachem Mautner, "The Eternal Triangles of the Law": Toward
a Theory of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 95, 109-29
(1991) (arguing that traditional and UCC protections of good faith purchasers for value
are justified by both efficiency and distributive justice principles). Obviously, a third party
will also be protected if the nonsigning spouse ratified the unauthorized transactions. See
Oldham, supra note 95, at 135-36. Rules in community property states illustrate such
legitimate third party concerns. Arizona, Texas, and Washington allow a bona fide third
party, but only such a third party, to rely on the formal owner's title. See Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 33-413 (West 2000); Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 3.104(b) (Vernon 1998) (formerly
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 5.24(b)); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.16.095, 26.16.100; Wis. Star.
Ann. § 766.57 (West 2001). The desire to save innocent third parties from having to guess
whether property in a single spouse's name actually qualifies as community property also
underlies the New Mexico rule, N.M. Star. Ann. § 40-3-14(B) (formerly N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 57-4A-8(b)), which allows a single spouse to manage and control property listed only in
that spouse's name. Anne K. Bingaman, The Community Property Act of 1973: A
Commentary and Quasi-Legislative History, 5 N.M. L. Rev. 1, 42-43 (1974).
255. For similar rules in the context of marital property, see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 14-2804(B) (West 1995); Cal. Fain. Code § 852(b); Wis. Star. Ann. § 861.17(4). For
analogous rules in business settings, see generally Morgan D. King & Jonathan H. Moss,
Avoiding Tax Liens on Personal Property in Bankruptcy: A Look at the Interplay Between
the Bona Fide Purchaser Provisions of the Tax and Bankruptcy Codes, 31 Cal. W. L. Rev. 1
(1994) (examining when a trustee or debtor can avoid a lien on personal property by
applying the bona fide purchaser and lien avoidance provisions of the Tax and Bankruptcy
Codes, respectively); Gregory E. Maggs, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine as a Default
Rule, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 783, 783-84 (1998) (explaining the longstanding "holder in due
course doctrine" that enables a purchaser who buys a negotiable instrument in good faith
and without notice of certain facts to take ownership free from competing claims).
256. Cf. De Armond, supra note 240, at 248-49 (advocating greater joint spousal
management to promote development of individuals and marital community).
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parties. Most important among these developments is the ability of a
spouse to petition a court to have his or her name added to the title of
marital property held in the name of the other spouse. 257 This remedy
should not be applied frequently, but its mere existence is crucial to facil-
itating a more equitable interspousal equilibrium. 2 58 We therefore share
Thomas Oldham's critique of unjustified restrictions currently applied to
this add-a-name remedy. 25 9
A difficult question arises regarding management of a spouse's in-
creased earning capacity, assuming that our view that it should be part of
the marital estate is accepted. Should the strong presumption against
sole ownership of marital property also apply with regard to this type of
resource? Should the career choices of individual spouses be subject to a
regime of joint management?2 60 The economic significance of each
spouse's career choices to the well-being of the other and to the marital
community cannot be overstated, so joint decisionmaking may seem ap-
propriate. But as already emphasized, career choices are also extremely
personal decisions. Therefore, while consultation is surely appropriate,
these decisions should not be regulated by formal decisionmaking proce-
dures that afford veto power to another person. Although the commu-
nity in question is the most intimate association people have, a commit-
257. Cal. Fam. Code § 1101(c); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 766.70(3). By providing notice to
third parties, the add-a-name remedy already accommodates their legitimate concerns.
258. See Oldham, supra note 95, at 117-18 (arguing that availability of this remedy
may incentivize interspousal negotiation and reconciliation).
259. As Oldham notes, there is good reason for not covering interests in partnerships
and professional corporations, namely, the legitimate interests of the other principals who
chose to do business or practice a profession with one particular individual. But there is
no similar reason to categorically exclude other types of businesses, even though in
particular cases a judge may justifiably refuse to grant, or may postpone, an add-a-name
remedy if the petitioning spouse does not have the requisite training or experience to
manage the business competently. See id. at 124-25.
Alongside this important remedy, a doctrine supportive of marriage as an egalitarian
liberal community should incorporate ancillary rules that facilitate the possibility of
requiringjoinder in the future. Spouses should have, in Carol Bruch's words, both a "right
to know" about the marital estate and a "right of access" to all its components. Bruch,
supra note 245, at 234-36, 279-80; see also, e.g., Cal. Fain. Code § 721 (requiring spouses
be given full access to information regarding community property transactions); id.
§ 1100(e) (defining spousal fiduciary duty to include equal access to information); id.
§ 1101(b) (authorizing court orders for full accounting of community property); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 766.70(2) (same); Unif. Marital Prop. Act § 15(b), 9A pt. I U.L.A. 143 (1998)
(authorizing courts to order an accounting and to "determine rights of ownership in,
beneficial enjoyment of, or access to, marital property"); cf. Bruch, supra note 253, at
738-39, 747-48, 751-54 (considering and rejecting objections to "right to know" and
"right of access" norms). A number of other community property states impose a fiduciary
duty on spouses in managing community property. See, e.g., Unif. Marital Prop. Act § 2
cmt., 9A pt. I U.L.A. 114-15 (discussing the California rule).
260. It is surely inconceivable to think that they will be governed by a regime of equal
management.
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ment to marriage as an egalitarian liberal community must leave these
decisions, from a legal point of view, in the realm of sole management. 26'
Finally, the residual sphere of management includes those decisions
that can be made by either spouse. 262 This sphere, like any liberal com-
mons sphere of individual dominion, raises the specter of overuse, and
thus triggers policing concerns. Although ideally the individual's con-
duct will not diverge from the communal good, marital property law
should follow the liberal commons prescription of providing a safety net
that protects each spouse from extreme cases of opportunistic, overly self-
regarding, or otherwise irresponsible behavior by the other.26 3 Thus,
where one spouse's continuous financial irresponsibility may actually
threaten the well-being of the other, an extreme measure of ordering
sole management or dissolving the marital estate may be required.2 64 In
other less extreme cases, judicial intervention should still be available to
prevent intentional depletion of the marital estate where it can be shown
that the acting spouse's primary goal cannot plausibly be to benefit the
marital community. 2 6 5
261. Cf. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that "an
author-spouse in whom a copyright vests maintains exclusive managerial control of the
copyright but... the economic benefits of the copyrighted work belong to the community
while it exists and to the former spouses indivision thereafter").
262. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-214(b) (West 2000); Cal. Fam. Code § 751; Idaho Code
Ann. § 32-912 (Michie 1996); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2346 (West 1985); Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 123,230 (Michie 1998); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-14(a) (Michie 1999); Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 3.102(c) (Vernon 1998); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.030 (West 1997); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 766.51.
While management decisions of one spouse might injure the other, extremely
irresponsible or overly self-interested consumption decisions might also be detrimental.
To be sure, the fundamental premise of sharing without accounting makes normal
consumption by a spouse unproblematic even if it is not equal to the consumption of the
other spouse. But the law should anticipate pathological cases and protect individuals
from their spouses' abusive consumption choices. This includes gambling, drinking, and
drug use, activities from which only one spouse stands to benefit and which threaten the
integrity of the marital estate. But cf. Oldham, supra note 95, at 161-64 (distinguishing
gambling as merely a risky investment and emphasizing the distinction between lawful and
unlawful activities).
263. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 5, at 577-79, 583-86 (discussing the role of legal
policing mechanisms as safety nets).
264. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2374 (West Supp. 2003) (petition for separate
property marriage in cases of "fraud, fault, neglect, or incompetence ... or by the disorder
of the affairs of the other spouse" or where spouse is an "absent person"); Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 123.259 (petition for separate property marriage on institutionalization of spouse);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-16 (petition for temporary sole management on disappearance of
spouse); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.301 (Vernon Supp. 2003) (petition for sole
management on disappearance of or abandonment by spouse); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 766.70(4)
(petition for sole management and control on "spouse's gross mismanagement, waste or
absence"); see also Bruch, supra note 245, at 276-78 (describing state statutes giving sole
management control to one spouse in exigent situations).
265. See Oldham, supra note 95, at 155, 157 (advocating a spousal duty to manage
community property in good faith and arguing that spouses should not be allowed to
intentionally destroy community property); Alexandria Streich, Note, Spousal Fiduciaries
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While these safeguards are important, a higher standard of care for
active spouses-making them liable for negligent or unwise decisions-is
neither required nor desirable. 266 The active spouse's own self-interest
should normally suffice to ensure his or her best efforts. A legal duty of
care in the marital context might even be counterproductive. A negli-
gence rule might encourage active spouses to operate in an exceedingly
conservative fashion; it also obliterates the important distinction between
professional managers, who are paid for their management, and active
spouses, who are not and should not be paid and who should enjoy the
protective solidarity of the marital community for their unfortunate deci-
sions (mirroring the treatment of successful decisions, the fruits of which
should also be shared). 267
in the Marital Partnership: Marriage Means Business but the Sharks Do Not Have a Code
of Conduct, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 367, 383-84 (1998) (advocating a model of spousal fiduciary
duty based on fiduciary model of business partnership). Streich also notes that Louisiana
and Washington define breach of spousal fiduciary duty negatively, as "bad faith" rather
than lack of "good faith." Id. at 383; see also La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2354 ("A spouse is
liable for any loss or damage caused by fraud or bad faith in the management of the
community property."); Cooper v. Cooper, 619 So. 2d 1210, 1211-12 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
(finding a spouse not liable under article 2354 for secretly spending community funds,
unless fraud, bad faith, or mismanagement is shown); Peters v. Skalman, 617 P.2d 448, 452
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980) ("Losses ... which result from the managing spouse's activities flow
to the community, absent a showing of bad faith."). Other community property states-
including, interestingly enough, Louisiana-have defined breach of spousal duty in more
demanding terms as fraud or constructive fraud. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2354;
Skrantz v. Skrantz, 617 So. 2d 206, 211 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (finding spouse liable under
article 2354 for community property spent fraudulently); Blanchard v. Blanchard, 839 P.2d
1320, 1322-23 (Nev. 1992) (holding that a spouse's misrepresentation of community assets
in a property settlement agreement amounts to fraud); Mazique v. Mazique, 742 S.W.2d
805, 807 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that "[iun the absence of fraud on the other
spouse, the managing spouse has the sole right of control and disposition of the
community property," and finding that spouse's gifts to other women and purloining cash
from community business to spend on his social life constituted fraud). In line with the
common law equitable division tradition, the ALI adopts a similar rule but-unless it is
.necessary to avoid a substantial injustice"-limits its application to negligence and
intentional misconduct effected after a certain fixed date toward the end of the marriage.
See ALl Principles, supra note 8, § 4.10(2), (5), at 750-51.
266. Cf. Streich, supra note 265, at 385 (suggesting that California, Louisiana, and
Washington courts have held spouses to level of fiduciary duty equivalent to that of
business partners). A more parsimonious interpretation of the sources Streich references,
however, suggests that California, Louisiana, Washington, and the other community
property states require nothing quite so stringent as a fiduciary duty, but rather prohibit
only bad faith, recklessness, and gross negligence. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman et al., Family
Law 100 (2d ed. 1991) (outlining less stringent standards of care in California, New
Mexico, and Texas); K. Edward Greene, A Spouse's Right to Control Assets During
Marriage: Is North Carolina Living in the Middle Ages?, 18 Campbell L. Rev. 203, 216-17
(1996) (asserting that negligence does not constitute a breach of good faith under
California marital law).
267. See Oldham, supra note 95, at 140, 155-60 (advocating a "sensible" solution
requiring only good faith in the context of unilateral management transactions). Contra
Bruch, supra note 253, at 757 (calling for enactment of a "fiduciary duty standard of care
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have explored the vision of marriage as an egalita-
rian liberal community and have articulated its doctrinal implications.
This ideal uniquely accommodates community, autonomy, and equality-
the values exalted in academic and popular discussions of marriage-but
breaks away from the endless and ultimately futile debates among propo-
nents of each of these important concerns. In addition to reconciling
these values, the vision of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community
provides the best defense for the rule of equal division upon divorce and
also supports the current practice of rehabilitative alimony. Finally, mar-
riage as an egalitarian liberal community entails important reforms, par-
ticularly respecting the inclusion within the marital estate of earning ca-
pacity gained during the tenure of marriage and marital property
governance,
Although we have recommended significant reforms to existing mar-
ital property doctrine, we do not believe that our proposal is radical. On
the contrary, this Article can be read as an interpretive theory of marital
property that isolates the most normatively appealing justification for ex-
isting doctrine. True, the reforms we propose are numerous. But the
success of an interpretive theory should be judged by the quality of the
fit, not by the quantity of rules that fit.268 In defending the most central
rules of marital property law-in particular the equal division norm-the
ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community reflects important
values already implicit in the law. We hope that our explicit articulation
of this ideal and of its doctrinal implications will facilitate reforms that
allow marital property law to live up to its promise.
fully comparable to that applied between business partners"); De Armond, supra note 240,
at 273-74, 280-83 (arguing for a higher standard of care).
268. As noted byJohn Rawls, because interpretive theories aim at both understanding
existing practice and directing its evolution, they necessarily focus on operative regulative
principles. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 19-20, 48-49 (rev. ed. 1999); see also Don
Herzog, Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders 18 (1998) (arguing that the shape of
legal doctrine "is made and remade as its narrative continues to unfold," and that "even
apparently surprising lurches can be integrated seamlessly").
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